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ABSTRACT 
Insurance companies are in the business of discrimination. Insurers 
attempt to segregate insureds into separate risk pools based on the 
differences in their risk profiles, first, so that different premiums can be 
charged to the different groups based on their differing risks and, second, 
to incentivize risk reduction by insureds. This is why we let insurers 
discriminate. There are limits, however, to the types of discrimination that 
are permissible for insurers. But what exactly are those limits and how are 
they justified? To answer these questions, this Article (a) articulates the 
leading fairness and efficiency arguments for and against limiting insurers' 
ability to discriminate in their underwriting; (b) uses those arguments to 
identify a set of predictions as to what one would expect state 
antidiscrimination laws to look like; and (c) evaluates some of those 
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predictions against a unique hand-collected dataset consisting of the laws 
regulating insurer risk classification in all fifty-one US. jurisdictions. 
Among our findings is that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, state 
insurance antidiscrimination laws vary a great deal: in substance and in 
the intensity of regulation, across lines of insurance, across policyholder 
characteristics, and across states. The Article also finds that, contrary to 
our own predictions, a surprising number of jurisdictions do not have any 
laws restricting insurers' ability to discriminate on the basis of race, 
national origin, or religion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We discriminate when we draw distinctions between things and 
people. Individuals, corporations, and governments draw distinctions all the 
time, and in ways that are widely considered unobjectionable. However, the 
word "discrimination" has taken on a negative connotation because of the 
various types of discrimination "against" particular groups of people based 
on particular characteristics, such as race, religion, or gender. Such 
discrimination is often deemed immoral, illegal, or both. 1 Much has been 
written by legal scholars and philosophers on the question of what 
distinguishes good discrimination from bad, 2 and there are whole fields of 
law, such as employment discrimination law, that are devoted to the 
I. See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 7 (2008) ("Drawing 
distinctions on the basis of certain traits in certain context has meaning that distinguishing on the basis 
of other traits would not. Separating students by last name feels quite different than separating students 
by race, for example . . . .  "); Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongfal Discrimination Wrong? Biases, 
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 151 (1992) ("We all know it is wrong to 
refuse to hire women as truck drivers, to refuse to let blacks practice law, to bar Moslems from 
basketball teams, or to refuse to sit next to Rastafarians at lunch counters. At the same time, we also 
know it is not wrong to refuse to hire the blind as truck drivers, to refuse to admit those who flunk the 
bar exam to the practice of law, to bar short, slow, uncoordinated persons from the basketball team, or 
to refuse to sit next to people who haven't bathed recently. "). 
2. See generally, e.g., SANDRA FREDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW (2d ed. 2011) (addressing the 
question generally of how to distinguish morally acceptable from morally unacceptable, and legal from 
illegal, discrimination); HELLMAN, supra note l (same); Alexander, supra note l (same); Richard J. 
Arneson, What Is Wrongfal Discrimination?, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 775 (2006) (same); Deborah 
Hellman, When Is Discrimination Wrong?, BALKINIZATION (Jun. 20, 2008, 10:30 AM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/when-is-discrimination-wrong.html (same). There is also a large 
literature on the specific question of whether discrimination of particular types, such as racial 
discrimination in the workplace, is efficient or not. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971) (discussing the extent to which discrimination will persist in a 
competitive market); John J. Donohue III, Essay, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986) 
(same); Richard A. Posner, Essay, The Efficiency and the Ef icacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 513 
(1987) (same). Any list of classic articles on the topic of what constitutes illegitimate discrimination 
should include Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. l (1976), and Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
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question of when discrimination should be deemed illegal and when not. 3 
Insurance companies are in the business of a particular type of 
discrimination, not among their employees but among their insureds. That 
is how insurance works. Insurers attempt to classify insureds into separate 
risk pools based on differences in their risk profiles. Thus, insurers openly 
discriminate among individuals based on observable characteristics. 
Moreover, they do this, among other reasons, so that they can charge 
different premiums to different groups of insureds based on differences in 
their risks. Discrimination or risk classification4 by insurers can also create 
incentives for insureds to minimize risks: that is, if an insured will take care 
to reduce her risk level, a discriminating insurer will lower her premium. In 
a sense, these two reasons (accurate risk classification and incentivizing 
risk reduction) provide the primary justifications for why we let insurers 
discriminate. Insurers provide a valuable social function-in risk shifting, 
risk spreading, and risk reduction-at least in part because they are allowed 
to, are expected to, and do discriminate. 
There are limits, however, to the types of discrimination that are 
permissible for insurers. Some of these limits are embodied in federal law. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 ("ACA"), together 
with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
("HIP AA"), forbids insurers from considering preexisting conditions in the 
underwriting process.5 The ACA also forbids health insurers from taking 
gender into account.6 Likewise, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
3. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An 
Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 337, 1 365--66 (1 989); Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational 
Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1 1 5 1 ,  1 1 75-76, 1 1 80-81 ( 1 995). 
4. We use the terms "discrimination" and "risk classification" synonymously throughout this 
Article when referring to insurers' efforts to sort insureds into different groups based on differences in 
risks. 
5. HIPAA prohibits group health insurers from excluding an insured's preexisting condition 
from coverage for more than twelve months after the insured's enrollment date, and the twelve month 
period was shortened or eliminated for people who were previously insured. HIPAA also prohibits 
group health insurers from excluding individuals on the basis of genetic predisposition to certain 
diseases. 29 U.S.C. § l 1 8 l (a) (201 2). The ACA prohibits all health insurers from denying coverage on 
the basis of preexisting conditions, and for health status generally, for children starting in 201 0  and for 
adults starting in 2014. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 1 1 1 -148, § 1 201 , 124 
Stat. 1 19, 1 54-55 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3) (adding§ 2704 to the Public Health Service 
Act ("PHSA")) (prohibiting the exclusion of preexisting conditions); ACA § 1201,  124 Stat. at 156--60 
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4) (adding § 2705 to the PHSA) (prohibiting discrimination based 
on health status). 
6. The ACA sets forth an exclusive list of factors that health insurers may take into account in 
setting health insurance premiums, factors including age, geography, and tobacco use, although the law 
specifies maximum premium variations that an insurer can charge for these factors. Gender is not a 
listed permissible factor for health insurers to consider. ACA § 270l (a)( l )A) (to be codified at 42 
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Act of 2008 ("GINA") prohibits all health insurers from denying coverage 
or charging different premiums to insureds based on genetic information.7 
Finally, a recent rule issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development ("HUD") formalizes HUD's longstanding position that the 
Fair Housing Act ("FHA") applies to insurance and prohibits housing 
practices that have an unjustified disparate impact on protected classes.8 
Besides those four federal statutes and one regulation, however, there are 
no federal laws expressly forbidding insurers from engaging in any form of 
discrimination in the underwriting process. There is therefore no federal 
law specifically forbidding insurance companies from taking into account, 
for example, race, religion, or national origin, at least outside the context of 
homeowners insurance.9 
What all of this means is that discrimination by insurers in the 
underwriting process is largely unregulated at the federal level, leaving the 
states as the primary regulators of insurer discrimination. How this came to 
be has much to do with the history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which 
effectively delegated to the states the responsibility for regulating insurance 
in this country.1 0 Whether such an allocation of regulatory authority with 
respect to insurance discrimination has turned out well is an interesting and 
largely unstudied question, a question that this Article begins to answer. 
More specifically, the Article addresses three general questions. First, 
as the country's primary promulgators of insurance antidiscrimination law, 
what factors should state governments take into account when deciding 
whether and to what extent to limit insurers' ability to discriminate? In 
answering this normative question, Part II integrates the risk-classification 
scholarship that has been published in insurance economics journals and 
u.s.c. § 300gg). 
7. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881, 
883, 888 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § J 182(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg- l (b)) (adding§ J 182(b) 
to ERISA and adding § 300gg-1 (b) to the PHSA). 
8. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. ! ) ,  available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=discriminatoryeffectrule.pdf ("HUD, through its 
longstanding interpretation of the Act, and the eleven federal courts of appeals that have addressed the 
issue agree that liability under the Fair Housing Act may arise from a facially neutral practice that has a 
discriminatory effect."). See also id. at 11,475 ("HUD has long interpreted the Fair Housing Act to 
prohibit discriminatory practices in connection with homeowner's insurance, and courts have agreed 
with HUD, including in Ojo v. Farmers Group." (footnote omitted)). 
9. See Part IV.8.1 (discussing the limits of federal law as applied to discrimination in insurance 
on the basis of race, national origin, and religion). 
I 0. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, federal laws that affect insurance are deemed "reverse 
preempted" by any conflicting state law, unless the federal law expressly provides that it is meant to 
apply to insurance. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). 
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law reviews. It distills from these literatures thirteen different factors that 
may shape the normative case for laws restricting insurers' capacity to 
discriminate among different policyholders. 
Part III, which takes into account the various normative considerations 
identified in Part II, attempts to identify or predict what actual 
antidiscrimination laws state legislatures should be expected to enact. 
These predictions will depend not only on what laws reflect the best 
balance of normative concerns but also on various political considerations, 
such as which laws most help insurers to maximize their profits (since 
insurers as a group will sometimes be a relatively powerful lobbying force) 
and which laws are consistent with widely shared social norms (since 
legislatures can also on occasion be responsive to the masses). Part III, 
therefore, takes into account political economy concerns as well the 
normative considerations outlined in Part II. 
Third, building on Parts II and III, Part IV asks the surprisingly 
difficult and previously unexamined question: What laws dealing with risk 
classification have states actually adopted? The reason this question is both 
difficult to answer and has been largely ignored is that the exercise of 
merely identifying the laws in all the relevant jurisdictions requires hours 
of painstaking research and analysis. And that is what we, together with a 
team of research assistants, have done. We have developed a unique, hand­
collected dataset of state statutes governing insurer risk classification. This 
task required us to identify and analyze the insurance statutes, and any 
related regulatory or judicial interpretations of those statutes, in all fifty 
states (and Washington D.C.) and then to code those laws and sometimes 
their judicial or administrative interpretations for five different lines of 
insurance-health, life, disability, auto, and property/casualty-and for 
nine different characteristics-race, national origin, religion, gender, age, 
credit score, genetics, sexual orientation, and zip code. The result is the 
first ever comprehensive database of insurance antidiscrimination laws in 
the United States dealing with those nine characteristics. 
Part IV summarizes some of the key results of our research and 
compares them with the predictions we developed in Part 111.1 1 For 
example, Part III predicts that all jurisdictions would either forbid or 
strongly limit insurers' ability to discriminate among insureds on the basis 
of race, national origin, or religion. Indeed, based on our experience in the 
insurance law field over many years, it seems that the conventional wisdom 
11. In the interest of keeping this Article a manageable length, some of the empirical results will 
be explored in a subsequent paper. 
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among many if not most insurance law scholars, teachers, and students is 
that every state in the country forbids the use of such characteristics, 
especially race, in insurance underwriting.12 Surprisingly, this prediction is 
incorrect: more than half the jurisdictions do not ban the use of race in life, 
health, and disability insurance, twenty-three states do not ban its use in 
auto insurance, and seventeen do not ban its use for property/casualty 
insurance, which includes homeowners insurance. Similar statements can 
be made about national origin and religion. We also found similar gaps in 
state laws for other policyholder characteristics: only fifteen states ban the 
use of sexual orientation in health insurance and only nine states ban the 
use of gender in auto insurance. As all this suggests, affirmative bans of 
insurer discrimination on the basis of potentially suspect policyholder traits 
are quite rare. Thus, only nine states ban the use of age in auto insurance; 
only six states ban the use of genetic testing in disability insurance; and 
only two states (Mississippi and Massachusetts, an unlikely pair) ban the 
use of location or zip code in property/casualty insurance. 
We conclude by offering a number of tentative theories that might 
explain these results. We also consider their normative implications. For 
instance, might the lack of uniformity in state insurance antidiscrimination 
regulation require a rethinking of this country's longstanding practice of 
generally leaving insurance issues to the states? To what extent does the 
fact that a substantial number of states have failed to even address core 
issues of unfair discrimination .in their insurance laws indicate a failure in 
state unfair discrimination regulation writ large? And what should we make 
of the stark contrast between this reality and recent federal efforts to 
address facially neutral insurance classification schemes that have a 
disparate impact on the capacity of protected groups to acquire housing? 13 
IL THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
A. FAIRNESS V. EFFICIENCY 
Laws limiting risk classification in insurance implicate a tradeoff 
12. See, e.g., Jill Gaulding, Note, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: What's 
Fair?, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646, 1646 (1995) (reporting that it would be illegal in every state for an 
insurer to charge more to African Americans because they have shorter expected life spans); Stephen 
Brobeck & J. Robert Hunter, Lower-Income Households and the Auto Insurance Marketplace: 
Challenges and Opportunities, CONSUMER FED'N AM. (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://www.consumerfed.org/news/450 (''No states, for example, permit the use of race or income in 
rate-making. "). 
13. See supra note 8. 
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between "efficiency" and "fairness" concerns. 14 The efficiency costs of 
these laws stem principally from the fact that they attempt to force insurers 
to charge the same premiums to individuals who pose different predicted 
risks. This can generate the twin insurance harms of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. 
First, regulatory restrictions on insurers' risk classifications can 
produce moral hazard by undermining feature rating and experience 
rating.15 Feature rating refers to insurer efforts to link premiums to 
policyholder characteristics that correlate with risk.16 Experience rating, by 
contrast, refers to the linking of premiums with policyholders' actual loss 
experiences.17 Both mechanisms attempt to improve the accuracy of 
premiums and to incentivize policyholder care (notwithstanding insurance 
coverage) by increasing the likelihood that a failure to take care will result 
in a future increase in premiums. These tools are undermined when risk­
classification restrictions limit the capacity of insurers to adjust their 
premiums. 18  
Second, regulatory restrictions on insurers' risk classifications can 
generate adverse selection. Adverse selection can occur when policyholders 
have private information about their own riskiness that insurers do not 
observe. If policyholders know they cannot be charged more for insurance 
coverage even if their riskiness is higher than average, they may be more 
likely to buy insurance coverage because they will not pay its full price.19 If 
this occurs, then insurers may respond by charging low-risk individuals 
premiums that are too high for their risk. Anticipating this sort of 
inaccuracy in pricing, low-risk individuals may exit the risk pool and opt 
not to purchase insurance coverage at all. To prevent this exit of low-risk 
policyholders, insurers can design policy coverage specifically to appeal to 
low-risks by offering incomplete coverage in return for a low premium. 20 
14. E.g. , Kenneth S. Abraham, Ef iciency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. 
L. REV. 403, 404, 406 (1985); Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, Regulating Genetic Information in 
Insurance Markets, 8 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 211, 211-12 (2005) ("[E]conomists can contribute to 
the debate [about regulating genetic information in insurance markets] ... by casting the problem as a 
classic efficiency-equity trade-off .... ") .  
15. KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 71-72 (1986) .  
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 72. 
18. See discussion infra Part 11.B.4. 
19. To be sure, insurers will classify risks even without the threat of adverse selection, because 
competition from other carriers will otherwise skim away the good risks. This does not represent a 
social cost, however, unless it causes at least some policyholders to purchase less insurance than they 
would like to purchase at actuarially fair rates. 
20. Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and 
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By contrast, defenders of laws limiting insurers' ability to classify 
risks typically rely on "fairness" based arguments. Frequently these 
arguments embrace a vision of insurance as solidarity-spreading risk 
within communities strengthens the fabric that connects individuals by 
having them cross-subsidize each other's risk. Risk classification 
undermines this vision, they claim, by splitting communities into ever 
smaller and more fragmented risk pools, particularly when it trades on 
preexisting social inequities and stereotypes.2 1 Even when actuarial 
correlations between characteristics and risk can be demonstrated, 
defenders of risk-classification regulation emphasize that this correlation is 
socially constructed, reflecting existing norms, assumptions, and biases that 
frame both the collection and analysis of the data that produces risk 
assessments.22 By classifying risks, insurers consequently assign 
responsibility to individuals in a manner that is much less stable and 
objective than actuarial science suggests.23 
While the concept of "fairness" in the legal literature is generally 
associated with opposition to risk classification, and "efficiency" is 
associated with defenses of the practice, neither side has a monopoly on 
fairness- or efficiency-based arguments, as described more fully below. For 
example, supporters of risk classification have co-opted the term 
"actuarially fair" insurance, which has long been used by economists to 
describe insurance that is priced at expected cost. 24 Despite these 
complications, it is helpful to summarize the extant normative literature on 
risk classification and insurance discrimination through the "efficiency vs. 
fairness" lens. Interestingly, each of these considerations is principally 
developed in a different academic literature. The efficiency implications of 
risk-classifications restrictions are explored principally in the risk 
management and economics literature, whereas the fairness arguments 
concerning legal restrictions on risk classification are explored principally 
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1608-15 (2011). See also Michael Rothschild & Joseph 
Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect 
Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629, 634-38 ( 1976) (describing a theoretical model in which the design of 
the insurance market itself encourages individuals to self-sort into risk categories). 
2 1. Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14 
CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 213, 227 (2008); Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health 
Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 287, 290-94 (1993). 
22. Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 534 
(1983) (''However much the [insurance] companies plead happenstance, insurance 'risk' classifications 
correlate with a fairly simplistic and static notion of social stratification that is familiar to everyone. "). 
23. TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY (3d ed. 2013). 
24. Although we have not found the earliest use of the term "actuarially fair" insurance, one 
famous early use was in the classic piece by Mark Pauly. Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral 
Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 532 ( 1968). 
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in the legal literature. The historical disconnect between these literatures25 
means that their collective insights have not previously been integrated or 
even gathered together in a single place. 26 The next two sections attempt 
this task. 
B. EFFICIENCY-BASED CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Adverse Selection 
As noted above, the risk of adverse selection is one potential 
efficiency cost of legal restrictions on insurers' risk-classification practices. 
Indeed, the risk of adverse selection is so often associated with regulatory 
restrictions on risk classification that some refer to the phenomenon as 
"regulatory adverse selection. "27 The social cost of adverse selection is that 
some risk-averse individuals forego coverage that they would like to 
purchase at actuarially fair rates.28 To the extent that adverse selection 
undermines an insurance market entirely (a so-called "death spiral") or 
leads to strategic insurer efforts to segregate low-risk and high-risk 
policyholders indirectly by offering multiple coverage options (a separating 
equilibrium), it can also undermine regulatory objectives to promote 
subsidization from low-risk to high-risk individuals.29 
25. See generally LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE (Daniel Schwarcz ed., 201 2) (integrating 
legal scholarship implicating insurance economics with policy-relevant, insurance economics 
scholarship). 
26. The paper that comes closest to collecting all of these considerations is Seth J. Chandler, 
Visualizing Adverse Selection: An Economic Approach to the Law of Insurance Underwriting, 8 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 435 (2002). Much of Chandler's paper, though, builds off of his own computer model, and it 
therefore misses some of the points that have been raised in other papers. 
27. See Michael Hoy, Risk Classification and Social Welfare, 3 1  GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & 
INS.-ISSUES & PRACTICE 245, 245 (2006). The disadvantage of adverse selection can also be framed in 
fairness, rather than efficiency, terms. Some promote the notion of actuarial fairness, which suggests 
that insurers have a moral "responsibility to treat all [their] policyholders fairly by establishing 
premiums at a level consistent with the risk represented by each policyholder." See, e.g., Karen A. 
Clifford & Russel P. Iuculano, Aids and Insurance: The Rationale for Aids-Related Testing, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 806, 1 808, 1 8 1 7  ( 1 987) (arguing that failing to screen insureds for AIDS would be unfair 
"because it results in the subsidization of high risk individuals by those at low risk"). Various industry­
sponsored advertisements in the late 1 980s trumpeted a similar idea: that it is unfair to pay for someone 
else's risks. Stone, supra note 2 1 ,  at 287. 
28. Jan Mossin, Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing, 76 J. POL. ECON. 553, 563--64 
( 1 968). These efficiency costs are particularly large in the rare situations where adverse selection 
produces a "death spiral." A death spiral occurs when adverse selection becomes increasingly self­
reinforcing; the lowest-risk policyholders opt out of the insurance pool, driving up premiums and 
causing the next lowest-risk policyholders to opt out, and so on. Eventually, only high-risk 
policyholders remain. Death spirals obviously generate substantial efficiency costs, as all but very high­
risk individuals forego complete coverage. Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: 
An Exaggerated Threat, 1 1 3 YALE L.J. 1 223, 1 224 (2004). 
29. Even ostensibly efficiency-oriented evaluations of risk-classification restrictions may reflect 
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Substantial empirical research has recently demonstrated that the 
threat of adverse selection is much more contingent on the characteristics 
of particular insurance markets than has traditionally been assumed.30 
Some insurance markets are quite susceptible to adverse selection, while 
others are resistant to adverse selection. 31 Various factors may impact the 
extent of this vulnerability. For instance, in some insurance markets, 
policyholders do not generally have any useful private information because 
all relevant risk-based information is known or can easily be acquired by 
carriers. In other cases, individuals may have private information about 
their risk levels but fail to appreciate how that information impacts their 
insurance risk. And in yet other cases, adverse selection may be offset by 
"propitious selection," which occurs when low-risk policyholders also tend 
to be more risk averse, causing them to purchase more insurance than high­
risk policyholders despite the fact that such insurance has a lower expected 
value for them than high-risk policyholders.32 
Numerous additional factors are likely relevant to the more specific 
prospect that a regulatory risk-classification restriction would trigger 
adverse selection. This would certainly include both the size and risk levels 
of the population with the "high-risk" characteristic whose use is 
prohibited, as both factors would mediate the ultimate impact on rates of a 
risk-classification restriction.33 It would also include the elasticity of 
demand among the population of "low-risk" policyholders, as regulatory 
risk-classification restrictions would cause them to face slightly higher 
prices for coverage. Elasticity of demand for insurance, in turn, would 
depend on factors such as the practical and legal necessity for the relevant 
type of insurance as well as the magnitude of potential policyholders' risk 
unstated normative commitments to individual responsibility. This may manifest itself in those 
evaluations ignoring alternative mechanisms to manage adverse selection risks, such as the mandated 
purchase of insurance or the provision of universal coverage. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Containing the 
Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 379-83 (2003) 
(cataloguing policy mechanisms for reducing adverse selection without resorting to risk classification). 
30. Siegelman, supra note 28, at 1224-25 (showing that such death spirals are quite rare and that, 
in many cases, adverse selection is itself uncommon). In a recent update and extension of this article, 
Siegelman and Cohen find more mixed evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets, concluding 
that the phenomenon varies substantially across different lines of insurance and even within particular 
insurance lines. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, 
77 J. RISK & INS. 39, 77-78 (2010). 
31. Chandler, supra note 26 (using computer modeling to show the extent to which adverse 
selection depends on numerous factors in the underlying insurance market). 
32. Cohen & Siegelman, supra note 30, at 67-68. 
33. Hoy, supra note 27, at 249-459. See also Chandler, supra note 26, at 498 (making a similar 
point by noting that homogeneity of risks in the underlying pool decreases the prospect of adverse 
selection, whereas heterogeneity increases this risk). 
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aversion. 
Other factors, which are more specific to particular lines of insurance, 
could also contribute to the risk of regulatory adverse selection.34 For 
instance, risk-classification restrictions are less likely to generate adverse 
selection when high-risk policyholders cannot overinsure, and thus 
multiply the "advantage" of being high-risk in a setting where carriers are 
forbidden from taking this into account. 35 At least in life insurance, such 
overinsurance is possible because individuals can own multiple different 
policies, each of whose benefits are unaffected by the existence of other 
policies due to the absence of coordination of benefits or "other insurance" 
clauses.36 The prospect of regulatory adverse selection might also be 
exacerbated by the existence of a secondary market for insurance policies, 
which is also a feature of life insurance and annuity markets. Secondary 
markets increase the risk of adverse selection by allowing high-risk 
individuals to purchase a policy with an immediate guaranteed profit.37 
They allow high-risk individuals to benefit personally from their life 
insurance products. Finally, line-specific product features, such as the 
existence of an incontestability period after which insurers cannot deny 
coverage for misrepresentations or fraud, could also increase the risk of 
regulatory adverse selection. 38 
2. Moral Hazard 
Legal restrictions on insurers' ability to classify risks can result in 
moral hazard, causing policyholders to take less than socially-optimal 
levels of care. For instance, some commentators have argued that rules 
prohibiting insurers from classifying policyholders on the basis of their 
34. In a working paper, we more thoroughly explore the circumstances in which various risk­
classification restrictions may produce adverse selection. See Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel 
Schwarcz, Explaining Variation in Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws (Univ. of Tex. Law, Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 522; Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-54; Univ. of Mich. Law & 
Econ. Research Paper No. 13-018; 2013), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2316866. 
35. Hoy & Ruse, supra note 14, at 222. 
36. In most insurance contexts, policies contain coordination of benefits or "other insurance" 
provisions, which prevent a policyholder from recovering under multiple policies in a way that would 
improve the policyholder's financial condition as a result of the loss. 
37. Risk-classification rules that would prevent investors from asking about individuals' genetic 
makeup, cannot prevent such transactions because these rules cannot prevent high-risk policyholders 
from volunteering information about their genetic predispositions to investors. While individuals have 
an incentive to hide their genetic defects from insurers, they have the opposite incentive when selling 
policies to third-party investors: the sooner the policyholder is to die, the more investors will be willing 
to pay for the policy. 
38. An insurer that sells individually underwritten auto or nonauto liability and property policies 
can cancel policies or decline to renew when the policy comes up for renewal. 
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health status may encourage individuals to eat less healthy foods or 
exercise less.39 Others have claimed that rules prohibiting underwriting on 
the basis of geographic area can result in the overdevelopment of homes in 
risk-prone regions, such as along the coast of a hurricane-prone state. 40 
In order for moral hazard to potentially result from legal restrictions 
on risk classification, two conditions must be met. First, the regulated 
characteristic must be at least partially within policyholders' control. A 
good example is a legal prohibition on insurers using health-related 
information of individuals in underwriting, as individuals clearly have 
some control over their likelihood of getting sick. By contrast, rules 
prohibiting classification on the basis of age or gender cannot produce 
moral hazard for the simple reason that individuals cannot change their age 
or gender in response to such rules.41 Second, there must be some "but for" 
causal link between the regulated characteristic and risk. Prohibitions on 
medical underwriting again provide a suitable example: an individual is 
more likely to incur substantial health expenses if he or she has a history of 
health-related expenses, and less likely to incur future expenses if she has 
no preexisting conditions or medical risks. By contrast, while individuals 
have some degree of control over their credit score (thus satisfying the first 
condition), it is unclear whether credit score enjoys a "but for" causal 
connection to risk of loss. Thus, while prohibitions on insurers' use of 
credit scores in underwriting might conceivably cause people to safeguard 
their credit scores less effectively, it is not clear that this would actually 
lead to greater losses. 
When these two prerequisites are met, legal restrictions on risk 
39. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL 125 (1997) ("Cross-subsidies necessarily allow 
everyone to pass off some part of the costs of their own risky behavior onto other persons."); Jonathan 
Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard, 50 J.L. & ECON. 519, 527-29 
(2007) (finding that mandates for medical treatment for diabetes generate a moral hazard problem with 
diabetics exhibiting higher BMis after the adoption of these mandates). 
40. HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER & ERWANN 0. MICHEL-KERJAN, AT WAR WITH THE 
WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISKS IN A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES 266 (2009). 
41. In fact, it is possible that a legal risk-classification restriction might increase moral hazard 
even though it does not target a characteristic that the policyholder controls. This could happen if the 
uncontrollable characteristic is highly correlated with a controllable characteristic that insurers do not 
observe. For instance, a prohibition on auto insurers discriminating on the basis of policyholder gender 
will increase the availability of insurance to high-risk drivers, say men who drive less carefully and 
more miles than women. This is the adverse selection problem. But, ifthe premiums for auto insurance 
do not vary according to miles driven because insurers cannot observe this policyholder characteristic, 
then, when those new men are insured, they will drive too much because they are insured. This is 
activity level moral hazard. Similarly if the premium does not vary according to the care with which 
one drives (speeding, abrupt stopping, etc.) then those new men will drive too dangerously because they 
are insured. This is care level moral hazard. 
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classification may generate moral hazard because they effectively operate 
as state-provided insurance against classification risk.42 In other words, 
these rules undermine individuals' incentives to take care by protecting 
them from the risk that their present behavior will impair their capacity to 
purchase affordable insurance in the future. Thus, prohibiting health 
insurers from charging more to smokers may increase the incidence of 
smoking and health risk because individuals will not worry that their 
decision to smoke will subject them to increased insurance premiums in the 
future. The magnitude of this effect likely depends substantially on the 
extent to which individuals appreciate the potential links between their 
behavior and future premiums.43 Individuals are unlikely to change their 
smoking habits in response to legal restrictions on insurers' underwriting if 
they are unaware of the potential link, or lack thereof, between smoking 
and future premiums. 44 
3. Socially Wasteful Expenditures 
The efficiency of risk-classification regulations may also be affected 
by the prospect that insurers' classification efforts are socially wasteful. 
One of the primary ways that insurers compete in unregulated insurance 
markets is by attempting to classify risks more accurately in order to skim 
good risks from other companies and dump bad risks on those companies. 
These efforts may be socially beneficial to the extent that they increase the 
number of low-risk individuals who choose to purchase full insurance.45 At 
the same time, though, these efforts produce no social benefit to the extent 
that they merely shift the composition of policyholders among different 
carriers, at least in those cases where moral hazard is not a possible 
outgrowth of risk classification. From a social welfare standpoint, the same 
individuals are insured and only the distribution of the resulting social 
benefits is at stake in the particular matching of insurers and policyholders. 
By contrast, these efforts do indeed produce a social cost in the form of 
money spent on classifying policyholders, which may be passed on to 
policyholders through increased prerniums.46 
42. See ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 71-72 (discussing how feature and experience rating affects 
loss prevention incentives). 
43. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REv. 237, 270 (1996). 
44. On the difficulties of empirically estimating moral hazard and adverse selection, see Ronen 
Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law-A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 58-61 (2012). 
45. Whether they are in fact socially beneficial requires weighing the social benefit of increased 
coverage for low-risk individuals against the cost of less insurance coverage for high-risk individuals. 
46. Keith J. Crocker & Arthur Snow, The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the 
Insurance Industry, 94 J. POL. ECON. 321, 338 (1986) ("[F]or intermediate levels of cost the market still 
categorizes even though the winners from categorization could not compensate the losers."). In this 
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In these settings, risk-classification regulations can be justified as a 
means for preventing socially wasteful investments.47 The power of this 
rationale for regulation depends largely on the extent to which risk 
classification is costly. Thus, this logic is likely to be a more powerful 
consideration when classification requires medical tests, genetic tests, 
physical examinations of individuals or property, or extensive analysis of 
loss data and mitigation measures.48 Indeed, this argument figured 
prominently in debates about health care reform's prohibition on medical 
underwriting precisely because of the cost of such underwriting.49 
Interestingly, this argument may also be persuasive when a carrier is 
legally or contractually required to investigate representations in insurance 
applications, as is the case with doctrines imposing a duty to underwrite or 
establishing a period of incontestability. 
4. Private Acquisition of Information 
Another relevant consideration in evaluating the efficiency of laws 
restricting risk classification by insurers is the extent to which insurers' 
classification efforts impact individuals' ex ante incentives to learn of their 
way, these private risk-classification efforts are analogous to individual investments in protecting 
property that merely shift crime to neighbors rather than reducing aggregate crime levels; in both cases 
parties invest in protecting themselves only to shift costs on to others. 
4 7. Of course, risk-classification regulation may not be the optimal way to respond to this 
problem. For instance, one recent article argues that it is preferable for governments to adopt partial 
social insurance that induces firms to invest in classification only to the extent that doing so is socially 
efficient. Casey Rothschild, The Efficiency of Categorical Discrimination in Insurance Markets, 78 J. 
RISK & INS. 267, 267--69 (20 1 1 ). Of course, social insurance schemes raise their own set of efficiency 
problems and are often, as a practical matter, not politically feasible. 
48. See Crocker & Snow, supra note 46, at 330--31 (analyzing the effect of nontrivial 
categorization costs). Genetic rating has attracted a wildly disproportionate amount of scholarly 
attention, even while far more commonplace forms of risk classification have slipped by without much 
academic comment. See generally, e.g., John V. Jacobi, Genetic Discrimination in a Time of False 
Hopes, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 363 (2003) (discussing the genetic antidiscrimination movement); Nancy 
Kass & Amy Medley, Genetic Screening and Disability Insurance: What Can We Learn from the 
Health Insurance Experience?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 66 (2007) (same); Robert Lowe, Genetic 
Testing and Insurance: Apocalypse Now?, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 507 ( 1 991)  (same); Robert F. Rich & 
Julian Ziegler, Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance-Comprehensive Legal Solutions for a (Not 
So) Special Problem?, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 5 (2005) (same); Mark A. Rothstein, Predictive Genetic 
Testing for Alzheimer's Disease in Long-Term Care Insurance, 35 GA. L. REV. 707 (200 1)  (discussing 
the genetic testing for Alzheimer's disease and its effects in an insurance setting); Richard H. 
Underwood & Ronald C. Cadle, Genetics, Genetic Testing, and the Specter of Discrimination: A 
Discussion Using Hypothetical Cases, 85 KY. L.J. 665 (discussing genetics, law, and public policy). 
49. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Health Care Realities, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/3 1 /opinion/3 1krugman.html ("And in their efforts to avoid 'medical 
losses,' the industry term for paying medical bills, insurers spend much of the money taken in through 
premiums not on medical treatment, but on 'underwriting' -screening out people likely to make 
insurance claims."). 
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own risk characteristics. Individuals may be deterred from learning about 
their own risk profiles when insurers can use that information in 
underwriting. This is a particular problem when the relevant information is 
expensive for carriers to uncover on a case-by-case basis. Such insurers 
will only be able to classify individuals through underwriting applications 
that ask applicants to represent their subjective knowledge of their risk 
levels, backed by the threat of rescission in the event a misrepresentation is 
subsequently discovered. In order to avoid this risk, individuals may simply 
refrain from learning about their risk status. This argument has gained 
particular salience in the context of genetic risk classification, with many 
commentators arguing that individuals are deterred from acquiring valuable 
information about their genetic makeup because of the potential insurance 
consequences of doing so. 50 The social costs associated with individuals 
not learning their own risk characteristics include denial of access to 
preventive medical care and decreased financial and family planning for a 
shorter expected life span.51 
5. Positive Externalities of Risky Behavior 
In some cases, individuals become high-risk as a result of behavior 
that is socially productive in the aggregate. For instance, doctors in high­
risk specialties such as obstetrics provide necessary and socially valuable 
services, even though their decision to become a specialist exposes them to 
substantial risk that may not be fully compensated for through higher 
salaries. Similarly, individuals who decide to have children obviously 
generate substantial social benefits that may not be fully captured by the 
personal benefits of raising children. But they also expose themselves to 
large new risks. In both cases, one can argue that insurers should be 
prohibited from charging individuals more for their socially beneficial 
choices because this will drive the underlying activity below socially 
optimal levels. 52 On the other hand, it is not clear that the most efficient 
way to subsidize high-risk socially productive behavior is via the insurance 
markets, and not, say, via the tax-and-transfer system.53 
50. See, e.g. , Susan M. Wolf & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Genetic Testing and the Future of Disability 
Insurance: Ethics, Law & Policy, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 6, 15 (2007) ("Pre-existing conditions 
exclusions in the context of genetics cause further problems by creating incentives for individuals to 
avoid discussing with their doctor symptoms and diagnostic options, including genetic tests."). 
51. Avraham, supra note 44, at 49-50. 
52. Daniel Wikler, Personal and Social Responsibility for Health, 16 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 47, 
52 (2002). 
53. Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and 
Insurance, 56 TAX. L. REV. 157, 234-35 (2003). 
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6. Efficient Redistribution 
Efficiency-oriented legal scholarship typically assumes that income 
redistribution should generally be ignored in analyzing optimal legal rules, 
because such redistribution is most efficiently accomplished through the 
tax-and-transfer system.54 However, laws restricting insurers' use of certain 
characteristics may provide a type of redistribution from the better off to 
the less well off that is preferable to redistribution within a tax-and-transfer 
system, for at least two reasons.55 First, such laws produce a transfer that 
naturally approximates the difference in well-being associated with the 
characteristic. That is, assuming the characteristic in fact correlates with 
differences in expected losses, forbidding the use of that characteristic 
results in a transfer to each insured who has the trait in an amount equal to 
the average expected losses associated with the trait. And this transfer is 
funded by slightly higher premiums charged to the insureds in the pool who 
do not have the trait. This may be a more desirable form of redistribution 
than the purely-income focused redistribution that is the focus of the tax 
system. Second, assuming the risk-classification restrictions target only 
traits that are beyond the insured's control (such as race or gender or 
genes), they have an advantage over a redistributive income tax regime, 
which has the notorious effect of distorting individuals' work/leisure 
decisions. Income taxes, that is, reduce the incentive to work, since the 
higher one's income is, the higher will be the income tax owed. By 
contrast, redistribution through insurance, based on a characteristic other 
than income but that also correlates with differences in well being (such as 
whether one has the gene for Huntington's Disease) creates no such 
distortion, while still resulting in a transfer from the better off (those 
without the gene) to the less well off (those with the gene). 56 
7. Collective Action Problems 
Rules limiting insurers' ability to classify risks may theoretically 
encourage insurers to develop more efficient risk-classification schemes if 
these schemes have public good attributes.57 Risk-classification methods 
are at least partially nonrivalrous because multiple insurers can use them 
54. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 31-35 (2002). 
55. See Logue & Avraham, supra note 53, at 167-68, 210-14. 
56. The disadvantage of risk-classification restrictions as a form of redistribution is that, if the 
insurance pools are relatively small, it might be considered unfair that the additional costs associated 
with the particular trait are being subsidized by only a small portion of the population; whereas, a tax­
and-transfer approach would spread these costs over the entire tax base. Id. at 2 16-17. 
57. See Abraham, supra note 1 4, at 423. 
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simultaneously.58 Similarly, certain risk-classification frameworks may be 
nonexcludable because carriers can mimic innovations developed by a 
competitor. 59 These characteristics suggest that individual insurers may 
have insufficient incentives to develop new risk-classification technologies. 
Regulation that prohibited antiquated risk-classification schemes might be 
able to overcome this problem by encouraging insurers to develop 
alternative, and more accurate, approaches to risk classification. 60 Of 
course, a major weakness of this argument is that it assumes that insurers 
would respond to risk-classification restrictions by developing more 
accurate classification schemes. Yet insurers may well opt for even less 
accurate proxies for risk in the face of restrictions on their classification 
practices. Thus, auto insurers prohibited from rating on the basis of age 
may instead rate based only on zip code, which can be a proxy for age. 
8. Insurers' Actual Usage of Underlying Characteristic 
Laws forbidding the use of a characteristic in underwriting may be 
hard to justify if insurers are not actually discriminating among 
policyholders on the basis of that characteristic.61 To some extent, though, 
this depends on why insurers are not using the relevant characteristic. If 
insurers do not use a rating characteristic because it has no apparent 
predictive value, then the case for legally restricting the use of this 
characteristic is extremely weak. Insurers are unlikely to ever use a 
characteristic with no predictive power in underwriting, meaning that the 
only social benefit such a law might provide is to articulate a moral 
commitment to a principle. But such a law could produce potentially 
meaningful social costs in the form of the public cost of legislating and the 
private cost of policing compliance. 62 
58. To be sure, the more rivals that use an improved risk-classification scheme, the less that each 
insurer can thereby gain a competitive advantage by skimming good risks from competitors. 
59. Even though insurers generally do not need to reveal the details of their risk-classification 
schemes under most state laws, and states provide trade secret protection to disclosed classification 
schemes, certain pricing strategies may be relatively easy for competitors to observe simply through 
market research. 
60. One potential example of this is the use of age in auto insurance. Age is a cheap, albeit 
imprecise, predictor of expected loss. Age may be predictive of expected loss because it proxies for 
characteristics such as (i) driving experience, (ii) likelihood of drunk driving, and (iii) attentiveness. By 
prohibiting insurers from relying on age, lawmakers may prod insurers to develop better ways of 
directly measuring these more causal contributors to risk. 
6 1 .  Evidence suggests that states often do pass coverage mandates that have no practical effect 
because all known insurance plans are consistent with those mandates. See Amy B. Monahan, Fairness 
Versus Welfare in Health Insurance Content Regulation, 201 2  U. ILL. L. REV. 139, 198-99. 
62. Compliance costs may exist even if insurers are not using the underlying risk characteristic, 
because the carrier must expend funds confirming that this is not the case. 
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By contrast, the case for regulation may be slightly stronger when the 
reason that carriers do not use a policyholder characteristic is because the 
cost of determining and verifying the characteristic outweighs the benefits 
of a more refined classification scheme. 63 Here, a plausible case can be 
made for laws restricting insurers' usage of characteristics that are 
predictive of risk but nonetheless not used because of the cost to insurers of 
evaluating those characteristics: even though insurers are not currently 
employing the troubling characteristic in their underwriting, this may 
change as the composition of the population or cost of collecting accurate 
policyholder information changes. Legal prohibitions on risk classification 
can therefore be justified as a mechanism for preventing potentially 
problematic insurer behavior in the future. 
Finally, the case for regulation may be relatively strong if insurers are 
refraining from using problematic policyholder characteristics because they 
fear the potential reputational or regulatory consequences of doing so.64 
There is good evidence that this occurs. For instance, both auto and life 
insurers often do not take into account policyholder gender or geographic 
location, even though both have been shown to predict claims and are 
relatively easy for insurers to determine.65 Similarly, long term care 
insurers do not generally take into account gender, even though this has a 
substantial impact on claims experiences.66 Evidence that smaller and 
newer firms have been more willing than established firms to introduce 
rating innovations suggests that this behavior is partially explained by the 
fear of public or regulatory backlash; newer and smaller firms are likely to 
be less deterred by the prospect of reputational or market backlash as a 
result of risk-classification innovation.67 In these cases, laws explicitly 
63. See generally Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, Testing for Asymmetric Information Using 
"Unused Observables " in Insurance Markets: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market (Nat'! Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1 2 1 12 ,  2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w1 2 1 12  
(noting that insurers often do  not use policyholder characteristics in  underwriting even though these 
characteristics have predictive value, and offering various potential explanations for this phenomenon). 
64. Id. at 22. Finkelstein and Poterba note a fourth potential explanation: that the predictive 
content of characteristics such as place of residence may be limited by the extent to which such 
characteristics are subject to change in response to characteristic-based pricing differentials. As they 
note, however, this is unlikely to be a substantial factor in most cases because the difficulty of changing 
the underlying characteristic will generally be larger than the potential insurance benefits of doing so. 
Id. at 2 1 .  
65. Id. at 20. 
66. Jeffrey R. Browne & Amy Finkelstein, The Private Market for Long-Term Care Insurance in 
the United States: A Review of the Evidence, 76 J. RISK & INS. 5, 13  n.5 (2009). 
67. See Finkelstein & Poterba, supra note 63, at 23 (explaining how one firm increased its 
market share by offering "postcode pricing" when other firms, fearing negative publicity, chose not to 
use such a pricing structure). 
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limiting insurers' ability to employ the suspect characteristics have the 
benefit of reducing regulatory uncertainty. Of course, a coherent argument 
can be made that regulation in these settings is neither necessary nor wise: 
when norms and reputation are sufficient to constrain private behavior, 
legal intervention may threaten to "crowd out" these extra-legal forces.68 
C. FAIRNESS-RELATED CONSIDERA TIONS69 
1. Control and Social Solidarity 
Perhaps the most frequently invoked argument in favor of risk­
classification regulation is that it is unfair to allow insurers to charge 
different rates based on characteristics that are beyond individuals' 
control. 70 This argument is typically grounded in a particular vision of 
insurance that emphasizes its capacity to promote social solidarity, or just 
egalitarian redistribution, by broadly distributing risks. From this 
perspective, many risks are the inevitable byproduct of the environment we 
all operate within, such as the political regime (modern capitalism vs. 
socialism), technological and scientific advancements, and other features of 
the social landscape that are, from the individual's perspective, pure luck. 
The economic costs associated with these risks should be distributed in a 
morally blind manner.71 Insurance is a social and economic tool for 
68. See, e.g., Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2000) 
(discussing the effect of a fine imposed on parents who were late picking up their children from 
daycare); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 568-71 (2001) ("[L]aw must be 
regarded as a substitute for rather than complement of social capital because it undermines the 
institutions that create it."). 
69. This section draws heavily from Ken Abraham's path-breaking article, Ef iciency and 
Fairness in Risk Classification. See Abraham, supra note 14. 
70. See, e.g., Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic 
and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 112-13 (1991) 
("Discrimination based upon actual or perceived genetic characteristics denies an individual equal 
opportunity because of a status over which she has no control."). Although typically framed in fairness 
language, this argument can be understood in economic terms to preserve the ability of individuals to 
purchase insurance against these risks, which is welfare enhancing. From this perspective, being born 
with unfavorable genes or permanent health problems is just like any other exogenous risk against 
which people desire insurance. Prohibiting insurers from classifying on this basis merely allows people 
to protect themselves against this risk even though they cannot purchase prebirth insurance that 
specifically covers the risk of being born with an unfavorable genetic hand. See, e.g., Hoy, supra note 
27, at 246-47, 262-64 (discussing the effects of banning risk classifications). For a discussion of the 
possibility in the future of genetic endowment insurance, which would cover just this sort of risk, and 
the problems that such insurance might present, see Kyle Logue & Joel Selmrod, Genes as Tags: The 
Tax Implications of Widely Available Genetic Information, 61 NAT. TAX J. 843, 858-60 (2008) 
(discussing possibility of "genetic endowment insurance"). 
71. Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, and the Social Construction of Responsibility , in 
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 33, 33-51 
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counteracting this ethically unbound distribution of  losses, allowing the 
collective to largely rid itself of undeserved risk. When insurers classify 
policyholders based on individual characteristics, they undermine this 
feature of insurance by "fragmenting communities into ever-smaller, more 
homogenous groups."72 
Although the strongest version of the social solidarity norm would 
prohibit all forms of risk classification, many proponents of the social 
solidarity view will still permit classification when policyholders have 
control over the relevant characteristic. In such cases, it is fair to charge 
higher premiums because people choose to lead their life in a risky way. 
However, defining what "control" means in this context is not always 
easy-or objective. Individuals are generally deemed to have control over a 
relevant characteristic when they knowingly and voluntarily make choices 
that determine their status as high-risk or low-risk. For instance, 
automobile insurers are generally allowed to charge more to individuals 
who have been in an accident or received a speeding ticket: policyholders 
have a large degree of control over these factors because they can choose to 
drive more slowly or safely. Similarly, but on the other end of the 
spectrum, one reason commentators are often so opposed to genetic­
underwriting is because people do not choose their genetic composition. 
In many cases, though, it is hard to assess whether policyholders 
control their risk status. For instance, while individuals clearly exert some 
level of control over their health status, this control is obviously highly 
limited: fit people often get sick, and many obese individuals live until old 
age. Of course, it is theoretically possible to hold people responsible only 
for health features that involve choice, such as smoking, eating, and 
working out. But even in these domains, it is difficult to determine what 
choice means. Much behavior that seems voluntary may actually be the 
result of habit adopted in young age or addiction and, in any event, is 
highly correlated with numerous social factors, such as growing up in 
poverty or in a particular cultural setting. 73 
2. Socially Suspect Classifications 
A second fairness-based explanation for regulatory classification 
restrictions is that insurers should be prohibited from using classifications 
(Torn Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002); JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 42 (2006); 
Mariner, supra note 2 1 ,  at 205 (discussing the tension between universal coverage and personal 
responsibility); Stone, supra note 2 1 ,  at 290--91 (discussing social solidarity). 
72. Stone, supra note 2 1 ,  at 290. 
73. E.g. , Wikler, supra note 52, at 53. 
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that are socially suspect. The concept of socially suspect classifications is 
difficult to define with perfect clarity. The term itself is a product of U.S. 
constitutional law. According to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, laws that 
discriminate on the basis of certain characteristics are subject to a 
heightened degree of judicial review. Thus, while the vast majority of laws 
that discriminate among different groups will be upheld as valid so long as 
those laws have merely a "rational basis," laws that discriminate on the 
basis of suspect classifications will be struck down unless they meet a 
higher standard of judicial review. 
According to the Court, suspect classifications can be identified by 
virtue of having four factors in common: ( 1) there is a history of 
discrimination against the group in question; (2) the characteristics that 
distinguish the group bear no relationship to the group members' ability to 
contribute to society; (3) the distinguishing characteristics are immutable; 
and (4) the subject class lacks political power.74 Applying these criteria, the 
Court has identified three characteristics-race, religion, and national 
origin-that are considered suspect characteristics and thus receive the 
highest level of scrutiny, known as strict scrutiny.75 In addition, the Court 
has also identified a class of "quasi-suspect" characteristics (to date limited 
to gender and illegitimacy of birth) that receive an intermediate level of 
judicial scrutiny. 76 Given the criteria cited above, these judicial categories 
appear to be meant to provide protection for groups who not only have 
been habitually and unjustifiably discriminated against, but who also lack 
the political power to do anything about it. 77 Although these Constitutional 
principles obviously do not apply to insurers-who are not public actors, 
and thus not subject to the Equal Protection Clause-they describe broad 
principles that could be applied to insurers via state antidiscrimination law. 
The Constitution and the courts are not the only sources of meaning 
for what constitutes a socially suspect classification. More generally, we 
74. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442, 445, 454 (1985). 
75. The Carotene Products case famously established strict scrutiny and the concept of suspect 
classifications. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Subsequent cases 
identified additional suspect classifications. See, e.g. , Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (religion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 11 (1967) (race); Oyama 
v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948) (national origin). 
76. Intermediate scrutiny requires that the legal classification in question be "substantially 
related to an important governmental objective." Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). For cases 
establishing the categories of quasi-suspect classifications, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 
(1976) (sex), and Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1982) (illegitimacy). 
77. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135 
(1980) (noting minorities' lack of political power). 
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might regard as socially suspect any classification that reinforces or 
perpetuates broader social inequalities, or that causes some sort of 
expressive harm by acknowledging and legitimating prior unfair 
treatment.78 To appreciate the difference between classifications that might 
reinforce social inequalities and those that might only cause an expressive 
harm, consider an insurer that announced that it was willing to sell 
annuities at better rates to African Americans because they tend to have a 
shorter life span. Society might object to this practice even though the 
traditionally disadvantaged group is made better off as a result of the 
insurer's classification scheme. 79 
3. "Differential lnaccuracy"80 
A third fairness-based objection to risk classification arises out of the 
fact that all classification regimes are imperfect. Not only are predictions 
about the future inherently uncertain, but classification is itself costly. 
Efficient insurance regimes will only invest in improving classification to 
the extent that the resulting benefits are larger than this cost. These 
imperfections arguably do not inherently raise fairness concerns, as all 
policyholders are better off when insurers choose not to invest beyond 
efficient levels in refining classification regimes. 81 However, inaccuracy in 
classification can raise fairness concerns when the burden of inaccuracy is 
differentially allocated among policyholders, so that some groups bear a 
larger share of the cost of such inaccuracy than other groups. 82 For 
instance, differential inaccuracy was a central concern in the substantial 
literature on the use of HIV/AIDS status in insurance underwriting. During 
the AIDS panic in the late 1 980s, various life and health insurers began to 
refuse to insure individuals who failed HIV antibody tests .83 Various 
78. Abraham frames this category more broadly in his article, stating that a classification can be 
suspect for at least four reasons: (i) it is used improperly in other fields, (ii) it is not supported by 
sufficient data, (iii) it systematically works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or (iv) it 
perpetuates unfair disadvantages outside of the insurance system. Abraham, supra note 14,  at 442. In 
general, though, none of the first three explanations seem problematic unless they are coupled with the 
fourth. Id. at 443-44. It is not, for instance, troubling that classification schemes systematically work to 
the disadvantage of individuals with bad driving records. Id. Similarly, Abraham himself argues 
elsewhere in his article that mere inaccuracy is not, in itself, a basis for a fairness objection. Id. at 43 1 ,  
442. 
79. Although often framed in terms of fairness, this argument can also be understood in 
economic terms as an extemality argument: insurers impose harms on society at large by relying on 
certain suspect classifications. 
80. Abraham, supra note 1 4, at 43 1 (coining this phrase). 
8 1 .  Id. at 429-3 1 .  
82. Id. at 43 1 -34. 
83. Clifford & luculano, supra note 27, at 1 8 1 1 .  Even after the AIDS panic had subsided, some 
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commentators excoriated this practice, arguing that the HIV antibody test 
was too unreliable to support such testing because it created an 
unacceptably heterogeneous population of HIV positive individuals and 
individuals with false positives, forcing the latter to bear the financial 
burden of the former.84 
4. Correlation and Causation 
Insurance classification schemes are based on correlations between 
observed policyholder characteristics and ultimate losses. Of course, a 
correlation between two data points does not necessarily imply a causal 
relationship. According to the American Academy of Actuaries, insurer 
classification may "be more acceptable to the public if there is a 
demonstrable cause and effect relationship between the risk characteristics 
and expected costs."85 Often, though, objections to risk-classification 
schemes that are articulated in terms of a lack of a causal connection seem 
to in fact be driven by the perceived lack of a strong enough correlational 
connection. For instance, detractors of gender-based insurance rating in life 
insurance often contrast gender with age, arguing that the association 
between age and mortality is much stronger than that between sex and 
mortality.86 Similarly, at least some of the resistance to race-based life 
insurance rating "undoubtedly comes from the perception that it makes 
little factual sense, because . . .  [t]he apparent differences are mostly 
environmental . . . .  "87 
What these quotations reveal is just how slippery the meamng of 
suspected that insurers were continuing to discriminate against homosexuals as an at-risk group, by 
secretly targeting men in stereotypically gay occupations. Katy Chi-Wen Li, The Private Insurance 
Industry "s Tactics Against Suspected Homosexuals: Redlining Based on Occupation. Residence, and 
Marital Status, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 477, 479-80 (1 996). 
84. Judith A. Berman, Note, AIDS Antibody Testing and Health Insurance Underwriting: A 
Paradigmatic Inquiry, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 059, 1 073-74 ( 1 989). 
85. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES COMM. ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, RISK CLASSIFICATION 
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 1 5  [hereinafter RISK CLASSIFICATION STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES], 
available at http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/pdf/riskclassificationSOP.pdf. See also AM. ACAD. 
OF ACTUARIES RISK CLASSIFICATION WORK GRP., ON RISK CLASSIFICATION 50 (201 1 ), available al 
http://www.actuary.org/files/publications/RCWG _RiskMonograph _Nov201 l .pdf ("In some cases, the 
use of a risk characteristic that exhibits a strong correlation to the outcomes of a covered risk, but for 
which no cause-and-effect explanation has been established, may be unfavorably received by the 
public."). 
86. See Lea Brilmayer, Douglas Laycock & Teresa A. Sullivan, The Efficient Use of Group 
Averages as Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Benston, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 222, 236 (1 983); 
Spencer L. Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 4 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 83, 1 08 ( 1 979) 
("Age discrimination is so basic in life insurance and annuities that any serious challenge to it seems 
unlikely."). 
87. Kimball, supra note 86, at 1 1 2. 
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"causation" can be in this context. 88 Indeed, it is often not clear exactly 
what is meant by assertions that a relationship between an underwriting 
factor and risk is causal. 89 Perhaps the clearest answer is that there is a "but 
for" causal link, such that a change in the characteristic being underwritten 
would necessarily produce a change in loss experiences, holding all else 
equal. Thus, the causal link between credit scores and losses could be 
contested on the basis that credit scores decreased significantly in the wake 
of the Great Recession, but loss experiences did not adjust accordingly.90 
(Of course, if it is relative credit score-the score compared to others-that 
matters to insurers, then a general drop in the average credit score is not 
relevant to insurers' risk analyses.) 
But while "but for" causation may be necessary, it is likely not 
sufficient for a causal relationship to exist, as any first-year tort student can 
explain. Just as in tort law, causation inevitably also includes some notion 
of "proximate cause" to ensure that the relationship between a "but for" 
characteristic and loss is not excessively attenuated. None of this means 
that the concept of causation cannot be operationalized in insurance: for 
instance, most would agree that the link between smoking and life 
expectancy is causal. Rather, it means that this link depends on factors such 
as the degree of correlation between policyholder characteristic and risk of 
loss, as well as the ease with which one can construct stories connecting 
policyholder characteristics and risk. 
To the extent that causal links between policyholder characteristics 
and risk can be meaningfully identified, they tend to play one of two roles 
in fairness-based critiques of risk-classification schemes and their 
regulation. First, whenever the link between a particular characteristic and 
risk is perceived to be noncausal, the use of the characteristic may be 
challenged on the grounds of differential inaccuracy, as described above. In 
such cases, it can always be argued that (i) the relevant characteristic is 
simply a proxy for some other causal contributor to risk, and (ii) the burden 
of this inaccuracy is only borne by the portion of the risk pool with the 
relevant characteristic. For instance, suppose that recent immigrants tend to 
get into more car accidents, but that is entirely attributable to the fact that 
many recent immigrants were trained to drive on the left side of the road. In 
88.  Austin, supra note 22, at 559, 563 ("[C]ausation cannot serve as a neutral basis . . . .  Causal 
attribution is merely a subterfuge and cannot be a substitute for value judgment."). 
89. According to the American Academy of Actuaries, "in insurance it is often impossible to 
prove statistically any postulated cause and effect relationship." RISK CLASSIFICATION STATEMENT OF 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 85, at 1 5. 
90. See supra Part 11.B.2. 
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these circumstances, charging recent immigrants more for auto insurance 
might be contested due to the lack of causation between the characteristic 
and risk. However, the fairness concern is in fact better framed in terms of 
differential inaccuracy: the insurer practice has the effect of forcing all 
recent immigrants, including those who learned to drive on the right side of 
the road, to bear the burden associated with imperfect rating. 
A second, logically distinct objection to the use of characteristics that 
are not perceived to be causally connected to risk is that using such 
characteristics can have the effect of masking classification practices that 
are objectionable for reasons already noted, such as lack of policyholder 
control or because they trade on socially suspect characteristics. For 
instance, the primary objection to insurers' use of credit scores to rate 
individuals is that this simply proxies for other, more objectionable, 
policyholder characteristics, such as race and income.9 1 This argument is 
logically distinct from the differential inaccuracy point because it is based 
on the notion that the lack of understanding of the connection between the 
characteristic and the risk masks some unfair result. 
5 .  Privacy 
A final fairness-based factor in evaluating the propriety of insurer 
risk-classification measures is policyholder privacy. Although the purchase 
of insurance is usually voluntary, insurance is often a practical prerequisite 
to a wide range of modern necessities, such as driving and owning a home. 
Consequently, allowing insurers to demand certain highly personal pieces 
of information-such as HIV status, genetic information, or sexual 
orientation-is often viewed as unduly intrusive.92 More recently, there are 
also concerns that insurers violate policyholder privacy when they acquire 
information for underwriting without meaningful cooperation or consent 
from policyholders. This might include information about consumers' 
browsing histories and purchasing patterns that individuals do not 
reasonably expect will be available to insurers in underwriting. 
9 1 .  FED. TRADE COMM'N, CREDIT-BASED INSURANCE SCORES: IMPACTS ON CONSUMERS OF 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 61-65 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
reports/credit-based-insurance-scores-impacts-consumers-automobile-insurance-report-congress­
federal-trade/p044804 facta _report_ credit-based _insurance_ scores.pdf. 
92. See, e.g. , Sandra E. Stone, HIV Testing and Insurance Applicants: Exploring Constitutional 
Alternatives to Statutory Protections, 19  HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 1 63, 1 1 8 1-83 ( 1 992) (discussing 
court opinions tackling the issue of informational privacy). 
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III. PREDICTING STATE INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 
This part attempts to translate the broad range of normative factors 
discussed in Part II into specific predictions about the contours of state 
insurance antidiscrimination law. Because the development of state 
insurance law and regulation is ultimately a political exercise, Part III 
attempts to balance the conflicting normative concerns discussed in Part II 
with the political realities of state insurance regulation. The principal goal 
of this part is simply to provide a framework for analyzing the data 
regarding the actual pattern of state laws governing insurer risk 
classification, which are reviewed in Part IV. Given the tentative nature of 
our hypotheses, and how easy it would be for the balance of concerns to be 
given slightly different weight in different contexts, we will not be shocked 
to find that the results diverge from our predictions. 
A. SETTiNG THE STAGE : KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF INSURANCE 
Drawing from two distinct literatures on insurance discrimination, Part 
II identified the efficiency and fairness considerations that a benevolent 
legislature might consider in deciding whether to restrict an insurer's 
ability to discriminate with respect to a particular characteristic in the 
underwriting process. But how might these various normative 
considerations affect which particular state laws get enacted? Making such 
predictions is fraught with difficulty for two general reasons. First, fairness 
and efficiency concerns often, though not always, cut in opposite 
directions. Balancing efficiency and fairness concerns is what lawmakers 
are asked to do every day, but predicting the outcome of such balancing is 
no easy task. 
The second difficulty arises from the fact that lawmaking is messy. 
There are of course many different theories of how law gets made. Interest 
group theories tend to view legal rules-statutes and regulations and even 
court decisions-as outputs of a market-like process in which interested 
parties use the lawmaking process to "purchase" legal outcomes that 
further their interests.93 From this perspective, the arguments from Part II 
that are most likely to impact legislative outcomes are those that impact 
insurers' bottom lines. By contrast, public interest theories tend to be more 
optimistic about what motivates legislatures, agencies, and judges and thus 
93. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227-33 ( 1986) (discussing interest 
group theory). 
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more optimistic about the nature and quality of the laws they produce.94 On 
this more rosy view, all of the fairness and efficiency arguments developed 
in Part II should carry actual weight with lawmakers, whether the 
mechanism for this result is the altruism of the legislators themselves or the 
existence of effective politicians who are able to convert good policy 
arguments into effective political leverage. The best theories of the 
lawmaking process, of course, adopt a blend of these competing 
approaches. Such blended theories take seriously the political influence of 
relatively small but well-organized and highly motivated interest groups, 
while simultaneously acknowledging the power of the diffuse majority with 
respect to issues that they care about-or are made to care about. We take a 
blended approach in this Article. 
There is support in the political science literature for taking such an 
approach. The definitive study of the political economy of the insurance 
industry is The Political Economy of Regulation: The Case of Insurance, 
by Kenneth J. Meier.95 Meier concluded that no single theory could fully 
describe the landscape of insurance regulation.96 Rather, insurance 
regulation is a multi-faceted and complex activity that is influenced by a 
number of competing and often conflicting interests.97 To be sure, 
insurance companies often do get their way in the regulatory domain, even 
on occasion at the expense of policyholders' best interests-or at least what 
some consumer interest group regards as their best interests.98 At the same 
time, though, insurers are not always able completely to capture state 
regulation. In part, this is because the insurance industry is heterogeneous 
with respect to many issues, as property/casualty insurers sometimes have 
different interests than life insurers and large companies sometimes have 
different interests than small insurers. 99 But it is also because consumer 
groups and political entrepreneurs can organize consumer oppos1t10n to 
certain industry-friendly positions, and in many cases, highly motivated 
94. See generally James Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 4 1 PUB. INT. 77 (1975) 
(discussing client-serving bureaucracies). 
95. KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF INSURANCE 
(1988). 
96. Id. at 168-72. 
97. Id. at 167. 
98. Robert Hunter, A Failure of Oversight in Need of Rescue: Insurance Regulation, NY BAR 
ASS'N J. Gov'T, L. & POL'Y, Winter 201 1 ,  at 6, 7-8; Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through 
Consumer Empowerment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation, in PREVENTING 
REGULATORY CAPTURE (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2013), available at 
http://www.tobinproject.org/sites/tobinproject.org/files/assets/Schwarcz"/o20Consumer"/o20Empowerme 
nt%20Programs%200 1 . 16 . 13 .pdf (discussing various consumer empowerment mechanisms used to 
counteract insurance industry influence on government policy). 
99. MEIER, supra note 95, at 167-68. 
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regulators or "bureaucrats" effectively advocate for their own vision of the 
public interest.100 Adaitionally, scrutiny of insurance issues at the federal 
level can often trigger state regulatory reform.101 
B. PREDICTIONS 
1 .  Efficiency-Based Predictions 
Adverse selection: As discussed in Part II, one major efficiency cost of 
disallowing insurers' ability to classify according to certain characteristics 
is that it irlhibits insurers' ability to combat the problem of adverse 
selection. Adverse selection is not merely a problem of social efficiency; it 
threatens insurers' ability to make a profit by insuring particular risks. 
Additionally, adverse selection can actually undermine fairness-based 
rationales for limiting discrimination, at least if it is sufficiently severe to 
produce a death spiral or if insurers can combat it by segregating risks 
indirectly by offering different levels of coverage. Thus, we predict that, 
for those line/characteristic combinations where adverse selection is 
especially problematic, state antidiscrimination laws will tend to be 
relatively weak on average because (i) some insurers will be strongly 
motivated to ensure this result, (ii) other industry players will have little 
reason to oppose this result, and (iii) this result is potentially consistent 
with fairness-based arguments. 
Adverse selection is a bigger problem for some line/characteristic 
combinations than for others, and so we expect to see relatively weak risk­
classification regulation in .. those lines of insurance in which adverse 
selection is an especially severe problem. For example, as discussed in Part 
II, there are reasons to believe that adverse selection may be an especially 
difficult problem for life insurers. First, life insurance is one area where 
there is a possibility of overinsurance that does not exist in the same way 
with other types of insurance, because, unlike other types of insurance, life 
insurance policies do not contain coordination-of-coverage or "other 
insurance" provisions.102 Second, there is a strong secondary market in life 
insurance, but not in other types of insurance, which increases the value to 
insureds of successfully adversely selecting into life insurance pools in 
particular.103 Third, life, and to a lesser extent health, insurers face 
J OO. Id. 
J O I .  Id. See also Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Fixing the Lack of Transparency in 
Insurance Consumer Protection, 6 1  UCLA L. REV. 394, 456-58 (2014) (discussing how the threat of 
federal preemption has motivated state regulators to reform insurance regulation). 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. 
103. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38. 
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substantial product design and legal restrictions in their ability to cancel or 
nonrenew policies, because they must generally do so within the statutory 
incontestability period.104 Fourth, life insurance policyholders are often 
keenly aware of both their risk characteristics (such as age and gender) and 
how they affect mortality risk.105 Finally, life insurance is generally not 
legally or practically required for policyholders. 106 Moreover, there are 
various substitute financial products for many forms of life insurance and 
particularly annuity products. These factors will tend to increase the 
elasticity of demand and therefore the risk of adverse selection. 
Moral hazard: Moral hazard also threatens insurers' profitability, and 
thus we would make a similar prediction here: for those line/characteristic 
combinations where moral hazard is especially problematic, state 
antidiscrimination laws will tend to be relatively weak. Because moral 
hazard is only an issue with respect to factors over which an insured has 
some control, 107 this moral-hazard prediction is consistent with a faimess­
based prediction: for characteristics considered to be totally within an 
insured's control, state antidiscrimination laws will tend to be weaker on 
average than for characteristics that are considered totally outside of the 
insured's control. Likewise, since whether a characteristic is within a 
person's control can be considered a matter of degree, we would predict 
that, the less a characteristic is within one's control, the stronger the 
applicable antidiscrimination law will be. 
Insurer use of underlying characteristic: For characteristics that do 
not provide any predictive value to insurers, like zip code in disability 
insurance, we predict that the average level of regulation will be very weak, 
unless there is some strong expressive or symbolic reason for regulation.108 
For characteristics that may have predictive value to insurers, but which 
insurers nonetheless have not historically used, we predict that the average 
level of regulation will still be weak, but less weak than above. 
Other ef iciency considerations: We predict that the other assorted 
efficiency arguments-including the socially wasteful expenditure of 
resources, the potential public good nature of risk classification, efficient 
104. See supra Part II. 
105. See supra Part II. Whether policyholders fully understand the link between their mortality 
risk and their gender may be variable. See Howell E. Jackson & Allison K. Hoffman, Retiree Out-of­
Pocket Healthcare Spending: A Study of Consumer Expectations and Policy Implications, 39 AM. J. 
LAW & MED. 62 (2013)  (finding that women were likely to substantially underestimate their future 
healthcare costs). 
I 06. See supra Part II. 
I 07. See supra Part II. 
I 08. See supra Part II. 
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redistribution, and positive externalities of risky behavior-will tend not to 
impact legislative and regulatory choices. All of these efficiency arguments 
would tend to support risk-classification regulation (in contrast to those 
noted above) on the basis of broad social efficiency benefits. 109 But interest 
groups will tend not to coalesce around these social efficiency arguments 
because their benefits accrue not to small and easily identifiable groups, but 
to the diffuse public. no Similarly, while we expect that state lawmakers 
will be publicly oriented in some cases, we expect that none of the 
efficiency arguments in support of risk-classification regulation are 
sufficiently large or publicly salient to generate substantial momentum on 
this basis alone. This is especially true because these restrictions may limit 
insurers' potential profit, and thus face industry opposition. 
2. Fairness-Based Predictions 
Control and social solidarity: As mentioned above, we predict that the 
greater the control an insured has over a characteristic, the weaker the 
corresponding insurance antidiscrimination law will be, both for efficiency 
(moral hazard) and fairness reasons. The other reason why we expect this 
to be true is that, insofar as insurance antidiscrimination laws are about 
achieving some degree of social solidarity (or redistribution from better off 
to less well oft), such arguments tend to be most persuasive, or easily 
accepted, in situations in which individuals lack control over their 
circumstances. 1 1 1 
Socially suspect characteristics: Here we have two general 
predictions, the strong version and the weak version. The strong version is 
that, when there is general agreement that a characteristic is socially 
suspect (based for example on constitutional jurisprudence), every 
I 09. See supra Part II. 
1 10. See supra Part III.A. 
1 1 1 . The social solidarity/redistribution idea also suggests a cross-state prediction, one that we do 
not yet have the data fully to test: given that insurance antidiscrimination laws can be viewed as a form 
of redistribution from the better off (the ones without the high-risk characteristic) to the less well off 
(the ones with the high-risk characteristic), we predict that states in which voters are relatively hostile to 
government redistribution via the tax-and-transfer system will have relatively weak insurance 
antidiscrimination laws. We expect this effect to be strongest where the redistributive argument is 
strongest: for example, where there is relatively little control on the part of the insured. A simple albeit 
rough way of differentiating between redistribution-friendly and redistribution-hostile states would be 
to look at the blue state I red state divide in recent Presidential elections, where the issue of the 
appropriate degree of redistribution (through income tax progressivity and health care finance) has been 
a key component of the campaigns. Relatedly, states in which voters are relatively open to 
antidiscrimination law in other contexts (as shown in survey research or in the existence of state 
antidiscrimination laws of other types) will be relatively more likely to have strong insurance 
antidiscrimination laws. Perhaps the blue state I red state divide would work here as well. 
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jurisdiction will have a law forbidding insurers from using that 
characteristic across all lines, even if the characteristic may not have any 
predictive value in a particular line. As a proxy for the strong-version 
prediction we use the Supreme Court's concept of suspect classifications, 
which includes race, religion, and national origin.1 12 The weaker prediction 
is that, for such characteristics, at least the average level of 
antidiscrimination regulation will be stronger than the average level of 
regulation of other characteristics. Also, if there are characteristics that are 
well known, or even widely suspected, proxies for socially suspect 
characteristics, such as zip code as a proxy for race, we expect similar 
results, although probably not as strong. That is, there will be fewer states 
with outright bans, and the average strictness of the regulation will be less 
than for the socially suspect classification itself. For characteristics that 
have received intermediate treatment by the Supreme Court in terms of 
their being socially suspect categories, our predictions would also be 
intermediate. (See the discussions below of gender and sexual orientation.) 
Correlation and Causation: The correlation/causation concern from 
Part II suggests that stronger antidiscrimination laws will exist for 
characteristics that do not have a clear causal connection to risk. At the 
same time, insurers will presumably lobby extensively to use 
characteristics that provide useful risk-related information, irrespective of 
their causal link to loss. Our prediction then is that there should be stronger 
restrictions on average for traits that are perceived not to have a causal 
relationship with the risk they are said to reflect. 
Privacy: We predict that characteristics that are considered private 
and/or that require effort by the policyholder to acquire will be more highly 
regulated. 
3. Applying the Predictions to the Nine Characteristics 
How will these general predictions play out for the various 
line/characteristic combinations that we examine below? 
Race, national origin, and religion (the "big three "): Race, national 
origin, and religion have a special place in this country's history; and, as 
discussed above, discrimination on the basis of these three characteristics 
has been subject to stricter scrutiny in American law than have other 
1 12. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Obviously, the equal protection clause has no 
binding effect on private insurance companies, but rather serves only as a limitation on state power. We 
use the concept only as a rough proxy for characteristics that are universally regarded as inappropriate 
bases for risk segregation. 
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characteristics. Therefore, relying on the general predictions above with 
respect to socially suspect classifications, we predict that race, national 
origin, and religion will be prohibited characteristics in every state across 
every line. A weaker form of the prediction is that these three 
characteristics will be more strictly regulated on average than will the 
other characteristics. We make these predictions for all three of these 
characteristics, even though not all of them correlate in an obvious way 
with the risks associated with all five lines of insurance. 
Gender: Gender-based discrimination in insurance has long been 
controversial. 113 And differential treatment on the basis of gender is, of 
course, in many contexts widely considered unacceptable or illegal. 114 
Nevertheless, there does not seem to be the same level of agreement-as 
there is for race, religion, and national origin-that drawing gender-based 
distinctions is always wrong. Federal constitutional law treats gender as 
only a quasi-suspect classification; as a result, laws that discriminate on the 
basis of gender are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny. 1 15 This 
means a more searching scrutiny for laws that discriminate on the basis of 
gender than for laws that discriminate on the basis of other characteristics, 
but less searching scrutiny than for race, national origin, or religion. 
Therefore, we predict that there will be more variability across the states 
with respect to laws regulating gender discrimination in insurance risk 
classification than with respect to laws restricting the use of the big three, 
perhaps with states clustering around either end of the spectrum. In 
addition, because gender equity arguments tend to be used to improve the 
lot of women relative to men, and gender equity is a salient public issue 
that attracts various public interest groups, we also predict that the gender 
discrimination will be more strictly regulated on average for health 
insurance (where gender-rated policies often result in higher premiums for 
women) than for auto insurance (where gender-rated policies result in 
higher premiums for men) .  However, with respect to life insurance, we 
predict that the laws regulating gender discrimination will be on average 
relatively weak, since adverse selection in the life insurance market is 
113. Indeed, the question of the legality under the federal employment discrimination laws of 
gendered differences in insurance (or pension) premiums and payouts sparked one of the more 
important and interesting debates regarding what constitutes unfair or illicit discrimination in the 
insurance context and what constitutes merely a fair allocation of costs. Brilmayer, Laycock & Sullivan, 
supra note 86, at 248-49. See also Kimball, supra note 86, at 85-86 (addressing the Supreme Court's 
opinion in City of Los Angeles, Department of Water & Power v. Manhart). 
114. See Donohue, supra note 3, at 1365-66 (discussing the economic impact of gender-based 
antidiscrimination laws). 
115 . See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (first Supreme Court decision applying 
intermediate scrutiny to gender-based classifications). 
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especially problematic. Regarding property/casualty insurance, as there 
seems to be no conceivable correlation between those risks and gender, we 
predict either states will cluster around no regulation, or, alternatively, 
states will cluster around forbidding the use of gender in property/casualty 
insurance on symbolic or expressive grounds. It is also possible that there 
will be a bi-modal distribution along those lines. 
Sexual orientation: Unlike with race, national origin, religion, and 
gender, legal classifications on the basis of an individual's sexual 
orientation have not clearly been identified by the Supreme Court as 
deserving special scrutiny. In addition, unlike race, national origin, and 
gender, there are no federal laws forbidding discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation in employment. However, there are state laws that forbid 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 1 16 and some lower courts 
have held that sexual orientation should be a suspect or quasi-suspect 
characteristic.1 17 Although in United States v. Windsor, the Supreme 
Court's recent same-sex marriage decision case, the Court does not go so 
far as to explicitly identify sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect 
classification, the decision did strike down a key part of the Defense of 
Marriage Act.1 18 In any event, it is safe to say that discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation is at least highly controversial. Moreover, 
discrimination in insurance on the basis of sexual orientation would also 
implicate substantial privacy concerns. Thus, we predict that on average, 
with respect to life and health insurance, sexual orientation will be a 
moderately regulated characteristic, less regulated than the big three and 
somewhat less regulated than gender, but more heavily regulated than age. 
Moreover, there may be some cross-state variation. Because there is little 
reason to believe that sexual orientation correlates with property or liability 
risks, we expect relatively little if any regulation of sexual orientation in the 
auto and property/casualty lines. 
Age: We expect that age will have the lowest average regulatory score 
1 16. See, e.g. , Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act, 2002 N.Y. Sess. Laws Al971  
(McKinney). 
1 1 7. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 1 69 (2d Cir. 201 2) (finding that sexual orientation is a 
quasi-suspect classification and, on that basis, striking down DOMA as applied to the federal estate 
tax), ajf'd, 1 33 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
1 18.  United States v. Windsor, 1 33 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). The Court, declining to address the level­
of-scrutiny question directly, held that "[t]he federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, 
sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and treating those 
persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment." Id. at 2696. 
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of all the risk characteristics we are studying. First, age is not a suspect 
classification, at least not by constitutional standards. Second, age tends to 
correlate causally with several important areas of risk (mortality, health, 
and perhaps disability risks), thereby increasing the perceived fairness of 
rating on that basis.1 1 9 Third, age can present serious adverse selection 
problems for insurers if they are forbidden from taking it into account, 
since individual insureds know their own age and the associated risks.120 
Fourth, social solidarity arguments with respect to age are relatively weak, 
since individuals can spread risk over their lifetime through various income 
smoothing products. These factors are likely most important with respect to 
life insurance, where the causal connection between age and risk is obvious 
and regulatory restrictions would create large adverse selection concerns. 
Therefore, for life insurance, we predict that almost every state will either 
have no regulation or will explicitly permit the use of age. Regulatory 
restrictions on age could also create adverse selection problems with 
disability and health insurance, though these may be less severe because 
these lines of coverage are often sold on a group basis. As such, we expect 
more variation among the states for the use of age in health and disability, 
perhaps fewer with rules specifically permitting age-based classifications 
than with life insurance. With respect to auto insurance, age is a relatively 
strong proxy for driving risks, meaning that insurers have an interest in 
lobbying against age-limitations. At the same time, the causal link between 
age and auto risk is contestable potentially complicating the fairness 
argument. Even if age is causally connected with auto risks, it is arguably 
unfair to group all similarly aged drivers together. 1 2 1 These concerns lead 
us to expect variation across states with respect to whether, and how, 
insurers can use age in auto insurance underwriting. Because we are 
unaware of any correlation between age and non-auto property/casualty 
risks, we expect that most states will not regulate the use of age with 
respect to property/casualty insurance. 
Credit score and zip code: Credit score and zip code are not, by 
themselves, socially suspect characteristics. However, as mentioned in Part 
II, some commentators have argued that credit score and zip code are used 
by auto and home insurers as proxies for potentially socially suspect 
characteristics, such as race and income. By contrast, insurers argue that 
credit scores and zip codes are predictive of loss experience for reasons 
having nothing to do with these factors. Given the history of this debate, we 
1 19. See supra Part il.C. 
120. See supra Part Il.B. 
121. This is the differential inaccuracy point discussed in Part II. See supra Part 11.C. 
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predict that there will be a substantial number of states that have limits on, 
though few outright prohibitions of, the use of credit score and zip code in 
auto insurance and homeowners insurance. However, because insurers 
seem to have done a better job of public relations and of lobbying, we 
expect to see a fair amount of variation among states, perhaps with a bi­
modal distribution of some states clustering around no regulation and 
others clustering around limits. We expect little regulation with respect to 
credit score and zip code for disability, health, and life insurance, since we 
are unaware of any correlation between risk in these lines and credit score 
or zip code. 122 More generally, we expect the average regulatory score to 
be higher for zip code and credit score than for age, but lower than for 
race, national origin, and religion. 
Genetics: Laws limiting the ability of insurers, especially health and 
life insurers, to use genetic tests in underwriting insurance can be defended 
on redistributive and privacy grounds, for reasons discussed above. They 
can also be defended on efficiency grounds, as insurer usage of this 
characteristic could deter individual knowledge acquisition. Therefore, we 
would expect that antidiscrimination laws will on average tend to be more 
restrictive for genetic testing than for characteristics that do not present 
such an argument (such as age). We would expect no regulation of genetics 
for auto or property/casualty insurance, as there is no apparent connection 
between those risks and genetics. With respect to life insurance, we would 
predict that genetic testing would be permitted or not regulated in almost 
all states, for adverse selection reasons. Given the federal law forbidding 
genetics in health insurance, we predict that for health insurance most 
states would prohibit it. Because disability insurance presents greater 
adverse selection concerns, we expect more variation-more willingness to 
allow. 
1 22.  While it is true that some have argued that zip code, and perhaps credit score, are proxies for 
other factors that may correspond to health, disability, or life risks, we are unaware of any insurers 
using zip code or credit score in those lines. 
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All of our predictions are summarized in  the following table. The 
columns represent the five lines of insurance, and the rows are for the nine 
characteristics we examined. 
TABLE 1. State Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws: Predictions 
Auto Disability Health Life Property/ 
Casualty 
Race 
Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 
across all across all across all across all across all 
states (highest states (highest states (highest states (highest states (highest 
average level average level average level average level average level 
of strictness) of strictness) of strictness) of strictness) of strictness) 
National Same as race Same as race Same as race Same as race Same as race 
Origin 
Religion Same as race Same as race Same as race Same as race Same as race 
Gender Variation Variation Variation No regulation No regulation 
across states, across states, across states, or explicitly in 
with possible with possible with possible permitted in substantially 
bi-modal BMD BMD; substantially all states, 
distribution 
stronger all states, because not 
limitations mainly relevant to 
(BMD) than with auto because of risk, or 
insurance adverse prohibited on 
because selection expressive 
insurer grounds, 
discrimination possible BMD 
hurts women 
Sexual No regulation, Variation Variation Variation No regulation, 
Orient. because not across states, across states, across states, because not 
relevant to with possible with possible with possible relevant to 
risk BMD BMD BMD risk 
Age Limited Limited Limited No regulation No regulation 
regulation, regulation regulation or explicitly 
with some permit 
variation 
across states 
Credit Variation No regulation No regulation No regulation Variation 
Score across states; across states; 
with some not with some not 
regulating and regulating and 
others others 
limiting on limiting on 
proxy grounds proxy grounds 
Zip Code Same as credit Same as credit Same as credit Same as credit Same as credit 
score score score score score 
Genetics No regulation Relatively Most states No regulation No regulation 
weak prohibiting, as or specifically 
regulation on in federal law permitted, 
average, but because of 
with variation adverse 
across states selection 
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IV. THE DATA 
A. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND CODING OF STATE LAWS 
Although there has been considerable theorizing about the extent to 
which insurance companies should be allowed to discriminate among 
insureds in the underwriting process, as described in Part II, there has been 
almost no research on the question of what the law actually permits. It is a 
surprisingly complex and difficult issue. Because the governing law in this 
area is primarily state law, we first had to identify and analyze the relevant 
state statutes and regulations in all fifty states as well as the District of 
Columbia, as of 20 12. To make the project manageable, we focused 
specifically on how states have regulated insurers' use of nine 
characteristics-race, religion, national origin, gender, age, genetic testing, 
credit score, sexual orientation, and geographic location-and we focused 
on the five largest lines of insurance-life, health, disability, auto, and 
property/casualty.123 This exercise revealed statutes at all levels of 
generality: statutes that limited or prohibited all "unfair discrimination" in 
all lines of insurance with no mention of particular traits; 124 statutes that 
limited or prohibited "unfair discrimination" generally within a particular 
line of insurance; 125 and statutes that limited or prohibited the use of one or 
more specific characteristics either for all lines126 or for a specific line of 
1 23. With one large exception, the category of "property/casualty" insurance includes first-party 
property insurance and all liability insurance, including homeowners insurance coverage. The exception 
is auto insurance, which includes both first party and liability components and is so large in terms of 
premium volume and the like that it was given its own category. 
1 24. For example, Texas law provides that an insurer may not use a rate that is "unfairly 
discriminatory." TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 560.002(b)(2)(C) (West 201 3). Oklahoma, by contrast, treats 
"unfair discrimination" as a type of prohibited "unfair or deceptive act[] or practice." OKLA. STAT. tit. 
36 § 1204(7) (West 201 1). In total, thirteen states have general statutes forbidding "unfair 
discrimination" or "unfairly discriminatory" rates by insurers in all lines of insurance. Those states are 
Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, 
Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
125 .  For example, North Carolina prohibits ''unfair discrimination" in life insurance rates. N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 58-58-35, 58-63-1 5(7)(a) (201 1 ). South Dakota does the same. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 58-33-12 (West 2004). In fact, every state except Iowa, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin 
has a statute prohibiting ''unfair discrimination" by insurers or ''unfairly discriminatory" rates or both in 
connection with life insurance in particular. As discussed in the text below, however, life insurance and 
gender have come to be dominated by the NAIC model mortality-table statutes. See infra note 147 and 
accompanying text. Another example of general antidiscrimination statutes that apply to specific lines 
would be property/casualty insurance. There are thirty-seven states, and the District of Columbia, that 
have such statutes. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 390 1 .2 1 (M) (LexisNexis 201 3); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 27-44-5 (Lexis 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2403 (West 2002). 
126. For example, Delaware has a general statute forbidding the use of race in connection with 
any type of insurance. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1 8, § 2304(22)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 201 2) ("It shall be an 
unlawful practice for any insurance company licensed to do business in this State to discriminate in any 
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insurance. 1 27 
Based on these state statutes, we assigned a code for each line/trait 
combination for each state. We ended up with six possible codes that we 
arranged along a continuum, from those that are least restrictive of 
insurers' underwriting decisions to those that are most restrictive. At one 
end of the continuum are statutes that expressly permit the use of a 
particular trait, and at the other end are outright prohibitions of particular 
traits. Between these two extremes, the "general restriction" statutes (that 
is, the general unfair discrimination statutes) were treated as being more 
restrictive than the absence of any relevant statute, but as being less 
restrictive than statutes that specifically mention the trait in question. The 
entire continuum is reproduced below128: 
Expressly Permit (-1) - The state has a statute expressly or 
impliedly permitting insurers to take the characteristic into account. 
No Law on Point (0) - The state laws are silent with respect to the 
particular characteristic. 
General Restriction (1) - The state has a statute that generally 
prohibits "unfair discrimination," either across all lines of insurance or in 
some lines of insurance, but that statute does not provide any explanation 
as to what constitutes unfair discrimination and does not single out any 
particular trait for limitation. 
Characteristic-Specific Weak Limitation (2) - The state has a 
way because of the insured's race, color, religion, sexual orientation or national origin . . . .  "). Arkansas, 
by contrast, has a general statute that limits but does not outright prohibit the use of race in any area of 
insurance. Specifically, it forbids "refusing to insure or continue to insure an individual or risks solely 
because of the individual's race, color, creed, national origin, citizenship, status as a victim of domestic 
abuse, or sex." ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-206(14)(G)(i) (Supp. 2009). This very common type of 
limitation statute, found in many states, seems to suggest that race and other suspect categories may be 
used, but only if they can be backed up by accurate and reliable actuarial data. 
1 27. For example, Utah has a statute forbidding the use of race in insurance ratemaking for 
property/casualty insurance in particular. UTAH CODE ANN. § 3 1A-19a-202(3)(c) (LexisNexis 2010). 
Ohio has an antidiscrimination provision that is particular both to race and to property/casualty 
insurance; however, that statute forbids the use of taking race into account in decisions regarding 
whether to issue or renew a policy. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4 1 12 .02(H)(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 20 1 3). 
In total, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia either limit or forbid the use of race by 
property/casualty insurers. 
1 28. We acknowledge that this continuum from permissive to stringent restrictions is neither 
perfectly continuous nor perfectly scaled, but it is the best that can be done given the nature of the data. 
It allows us to "see" the data in a way that makes it more accessible. As with any grading scale, the 
differences between immediately contiguous scores (for example, the difference between B+ and an A-) 
can be slim in some cases. But the hope is that averages, across lots of measurements, will have some 
meaning; and the differences in the extremes (for example, the A and the C) will likely reveal important 
differences. 
234 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:195 
statute that limits the use of a particular characteristic in either issuance, 
renewal, or cancellation. 
Characteristic-Specific Strong Limitation (3) - The state has a 
statute that prohibits the use of a particular characteristic when the policy is 
either issued, renewed, or cancelled, or the state has a statute that limits but 
does not completely prohibit the use of a particular characteristic in rate­
setting. 
Characteristic-Specific Prohibition ( 4) - The state has a statute the 
expressly prohibits insurers from taking into account a specific 
characteristic in setting rates. 
One complication that arose was how to deal with overlapping statutes 
within a particular jurisdiction. For example, what if a state had both a 
general statute that forbids all unfair discrimination in insurance (Code 1) 
that applies to all lines of insurance, but also had a particular statute 
forbidding the use of, say, race (Code 4) in property/casualty insurance in 
particular? What should the code be for the race/property-casualty 
combination in that state? In such a situation, we generally chose the more 
specific rule over the more general rule. Therefore, in the example, the 
code for race/property-casualty in that state, based on the statutory law, 
would be 4-characteristic-specific prohibition. 
After arriving at an initial code based upon the state statutes for every 
line of insurance, for every characteristic, in every state, we went back and 
examined judicial decisions and administrative rulings within each 
jurisdiction to determine if the initial code was changed by a decision. 
Surprisingly, out of the 2295 trait/line combinations (9 traits times 5 lines 
of insurance times 5 1  jurisdictions), only 16 total trait/line combinations 
were changed. In sum, judicial and administrative interpretation of the state 
statutes had very little effect on the final coding results. 
Our approach to coding the various laws has an important limitation. 
First, our coding continuum is, for simplicity, equidistant, even though the 
actual laws are not. That is, we assume that the difference in the level of 
limitations on a state's ability to regulate risk classification between zero 
and one is similar to the difference between one and two. Second, and more 
importantly, many of the various intermediate limitations-which are, after 
all, laws requiring a showing of statistical correlation between the 
characteristic and the risks in question-may, in practice, be relatively 
simple for insurers to satisfy. In those cases, there will be little difference 
between strong limitations, weak limitations, general limitations, no 
mentions, and express permits. Instead, the important distinction will be 
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between the states that have outright prohibitions with respect to a 
particular line/characteristic combination and those states that do not. 
B. THE RESULTS 
In this section we discuss the extent to which the data are consistent 
with the hypotheses developed in Part III. To do so, we report some basic 
summary statistics. In some cases we report average strictness scores. That 
is, we simply take the average of the codes for a given set of states for a 
particular characteristic or line/characteristic combination. We also 
examine the individual state scores that make up these averages, the 
variance in state laws and the extent to which distributions tend to be bi­
modal. We ran various statistical tests on the data, but eyeballing the 
graphs proved to be just as revealing. 
1. Race, Religion, National Origin (The "Big Three") 
Figures la, 1 b, and le  present our finding regarding the "big three"­
race, religion, national origin-for auto insurance, yet much of the analysis 
remains the same for other lines of insurance. 
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FIGURE 1 a. Distribution of States' Scores for Race, in Auto Insurance 
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FIGURE l b. Distribution of States' Scores for National Origin, in Auto 
Insurance 
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FIGURE le .  Distribution of States' Scores for Religion, in Auto Insurance 
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Perhaps the most surprising finding was the fact that states do not 
uniformly prohibit insurers from using race, religion, and national origin­
contradicting our strong prediction about the big three characteristics. 
Table 2 below reveals that only ten states have forbidden the use of race, 
national origin, and religion across all lines of insurance. Those states are 
California, Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Two additional states­
Georgia and North Carolina-prohibit the use by insurers of race and 
national origin, but do not apply the same prohibition to religion. 
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TABLE 2. 
Characteristic 
Race 
National Origin 
Religion 
Gender 
Age 
Credit Score 
Genetic Testing 
Sexual Orientation 
Zip Code 
Number of Jurisdictions Completely Prohibiting Use 
of Characteristic in All Five Lines of Insurance 
1 2  CA,DE,GA,IL,NJ,NM,NY,NC,TN,TX,WA,WI 
12 CA,DE,GA,IL,NJ,NM,NY,NC,TN,TX,WA,WI 
10 CA,DE,IL,NJ,NM,NY,TN,TX,WA,WI 
0 
0 
0 
6 
0 
MT 
CA,CO,DE,UT,VT,WA 
The next finding observable in Figures 1 a, 1 b, and le above is that, 
regardless of the level of restrictiveness, the treatment of the "big three" is 
highly correlated in all states. 129 In fact, as these 3 graphs show, the scores 
per line of insurance are almost identical for these three characteristics 
when it comes to auto insurance. This is also true in the four other lines of 
coverage. 
Our weaker prediction of course was confirmed: As Table 2 shows, 
more states forbid insurers from using race, national origin, and religion 
across all lines of coverage than for any of the other characteristics. In 
addition, the average level of regulation of the big three is significantly 
stricter (at less than 1 % significance level), applying our strictness coding 
system described above, than for the other six characteristics we studied, as 
shown in Figure 2. Interestingly, Figure 2 also shows that, at the most 
general level, the regulation of the various characteristics follows federal 
constitutional law principles where race, national origin, and religion are 
suspect classifications, gender is quasi-suspect, and sexual orientation is 
1 29. The correlation is reflected in an average Spearman's rho of0.9. 
2014] 
not far behind. 1 30 
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UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE 241 
Mean Score per Characteristic 
Permit General Restriction Strong Limitation 
No Mention Weak Limitation Outright 
Prohibition 
While these results confirm our hypothesis that the "big three" will be 
treated the same, they are inconsistent with our prediction that the use of 
race, national origin, and religion would be prohibited in every state in the 
country. We have a number of theories to explain this puzzling result. 
First, perhaps state regulators and their constituents are under the 
impression that federal law already bans insurers' use of these 
characteristics. At least two federal statutes could conceivably be 
interpreted to forbid such discrimination. First, the Fair Housing Act 
("FHA") makes it unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a 
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or 
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of 
race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 13 1 Although 
federal courts were split about the FHA's applicability to homeowners 
insurance, 1 32 new final regulations issued by HUD formalize that agency's 
1 30. See discussion of United States v .  Windsor, 1 33 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), supra notes 1 1 7-1 8  and 
accompanying text. 
1 3 1 .  4 2  U.S.C. § 3604 (2006) (emphasis added). 
1 32.  Compare Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.  v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 135 1 ,  1 360-61 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act ("MFA") does not reverse-preempt the application of the 
FHA to prohibit racial discrimination in homeowners insurance, where state law merely forbids "unfuir 
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longstanding view that the statute does indeed apply in this domain, thus 
prohibiting both disparate treatment and certain types of disparate impact in 
homeowners insurance. 1 33 Even so, however, the statute does not affect any 
other type of insurance. 
The other federal antidiscrimination law that could conceivably be 
applied to limit insurer discrimination is 42 U.S.C § 198 1, which forbids 
racial discrimination in the making of contracts. But no court has 
interpreted § 1981 in this manner, and at least one federal district court has 
held that § 198 1 did not apply to a claim that life insurers in Louisiana 
charged higher premiums to African American insureds than to other 
insureds. 1 34 The court noted that § 198 1 requires proof of intentional 
discrimination on the basis of race, and the evidence in the case supported 
the defendant insurer's claim that any race-based premium differential 
reflected differences in risks. That is the only case we found addressing the 
application of § 198 1 to insurance transactions; and it went in favor of the 
insurer. 1 35 Thus, if states have failed to enact prohibitions because they 
discrimination"), and NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 302 (7th Cir. 1 992) (holding 
that the MF A does not reverse-preempt the application of the FHA to prohibit racial discrimination in 
homeowners insurance, where state law forbids racial discrimination and unfair discrimination 
generally), with Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 600 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that reverse 
preemption provision in MFA applies to disparate impact claims under FHA if Texas state law permits 
credit scoring in situations in which there is a racially disparate impact), Ojo v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 356 
S.W.3d 421 ,  422 (Tex. 201 1 )  (holding, on certification from the 9th Circuit, that Texas law does in fact 
authorize the use of credit scoring even if it produces racially disparate impact, so long as no disparate 
treatment), and Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 4 1 9, 423-24 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the 
FHA does not apply to insurance). See generally Sarah L. Rosenbluth, Fair Housing Act Challenges to 
the Use of Consumer Credit Information in Homeowners Insurance Underwriting: Is the McCarran­
F erguson Act a Bar?, 46 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 49, 49 (201 2) (arguing that courts should adopt a 
narrow approach to MF A reverse preemption in order to allow FHA disparate impact claims against 
homeowners insurers to go forward). 
1 33. See supra note 8. There remains some disagreement over precisely how such FHA disparate 
impact claims brought against homeowners insurers are affected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
1 34. Guidry v. Pellerin Life Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 592, 599 (W.D. La. 2005). 
1 35. This case is the reason we code Louisiana as being the only state that expressly permits race 
to be used for a particular line of insurance, here life insurance. This coding, however, should be taken 
with a grain of salt. A close reading of the Guidry case leaves unclear whether the insurer in the case 
was using insurance premiums that had been calculated explicitly on the basis of race. It is clear from 
the opinion that the insurer was systematically and knowingly charging African Americans a higher rate 
than whites, owing to a higher average risk of mortality for African Americans. Indeed, the opinion says 
that, ''up until April 1, 1 982, Louisiana law mandated the use of separate published rates for whites and 
African Americans." Id. at 599 (internal quotation marks omitted). But it is not clear from the opinion 
whether this dual-pricing resulted from insurers' asking about race on their insurance applications or 
rather from insurers' using proxies for race. Of course, even if proxies for race are used, if they are 
knowingly used in order to sort people according to race, which is clearly the implication of the 
opinion, then it would be the same as if race were directly asked about on the application. The key fact 
seems to be an absence of evidence of racial animus on the part of the insurer, and the reason the court 
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assumed that federal law already did the job, that assumption may be 
mistaken. 136 In any event, this understanding would not explain the results 
for national origin and religion, as § 1981  applies only to race-based 
discrimination. 
Second, states may conceivably have refrained from enacting laws 
banning discrimination in insurance on the basis of race, national origin, or 
religion because they believed that preexisting state statutes that are not 
insurance-specific already had this effect. In particular, they may have 
believed that state law banned this type of discrimination in the provision 
of goods and services generally, and thus in insurance specifically. To test 
this possibility, we researched whether any of the states that lacked a 
specific prohibition against insurance discrimination on the basis of the big 
three had a noninsurance-specific statutory prohibition that would 
accomplish this result. Only two states-Kansas137 and Montana138-
possessed such a statute. Consequently, even assuming these laws apply to 
insurance, while this explanation may slightly change the number of states 
lacking a prohibition on insurance discrimination on the basis of the big 
three, it cannot explain the broad absence of such laws. 
Third, state legislatures may not have banned insurer usage of the big 
three because they believe that insurers have stopped using race, national 
origin, and religion already and thus that a law prohibiting their use would 
simply be unnecessary. In other words, perhaps the antidiscrimination 
regulatory work is already being done by informal social norms. On this 
view, insurers understand that if they were to attempt to risk classify on the 
basis of race, for example, that fact might be discovered, producing serious 
reputational repercussions. 139 There is probably some explanatory power to 
this story. We in fact rarely, if ever, hear of insurers using race, national 
origin, or religion when underwriting individual insurance policies these 
days. However, even if explicit discrimination on the basis of the big three 
is a rarity in insurance, it does not follow that implicit forms of 
found no evidence was that the dual-pricing in fact correlated with actuarial risk. 
1 36. J. Gabriel McGlamery, Race Based Underwriting and the Death of Burial Insurance, 1 5  
CoNN. INS. L.J. 5 3 1 ,  550-5 1 (2009) (suggesting a similar story to explain why life insurers stopped 
using race decades ago, despite the fact that it was technically legal to do so). 
1 37. KAN. STAT. ANN. 2 1-6102(a) (Supp. 2012) ("Denial of civil rights is intentionally denying to 
another, on account of the race[ or] color . . .  [the] use and enjoyment of the services . . . of any 
establishment which offers personal or professional services to members of the public . . . .  " (emphasis 
added)). 
1 38. MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4 ("Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation or institution 
shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race, 
color . . .  or political or religious ideas."). 
139. See McGlamery, supra note 1 36, at 554-55 (discussing "social repugnance"). 
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discrimination do not occur. Moreover, if social norms are already 
discouraging the use of these characteristics, why do so many states have 
laws forbidding their use? If the answer has to do with the expressive or 
symbolic effect of the laws, then it remains a puzzle as to why only some 
states care enough about this sort of expressive or symbolic benefit to enact 
the prohibitions. 140 
Fourth, and related to the norms explanation, maybe the lack of a 
universal ban has something to do with timing. It could be that a number of 
states enacted prohibitions on the use of the big three characteristics and 
then those laws contributed to creating a norm against their use, at which 
point the other states did not need to adopt the same laws. The data for this 
paper do not allow us to examine timing issues, as we are looking only at 
the law as currently enacted. But we are in the process of doing research on 
how the laws have changed over time, in all 5 1  jurisdictions, which may 
permit us to look at this possibility. 
2 .  Gender 
As Figure 2 above suggests, the average level of regulation for gender 
risk classification is, as we predicted, less strict than for race, religion, and 
national origin but more strict than for age. This difference is statistically 
significant. 141 Figures 3a to 3e below present a more detailed breakdown of 
our findings for gender. 
140. In a subsequent study that looks more closely at cross-state variation, taking into account 
differences in state voter preferences for such things as fairness, we may be able to find some answers 
to these questions. 
14 1 . A Wilcoxon sign-rank test as well as a simple student t-test show a difference which is 
significant at less than 1 percent between the "big three" and gender as well as between gender and 
sexual orientation, the closest characteristic from below. However, for disability insurance there is no 
significant difference between the way the "big three" and gender are treated. For life and health 
insurance, there is no significant difference between the way gender and sexual orientation are treated. 
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FIGURE 3a. Distribution of States' Scores for Gender, in Auto Insurance 
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FIGURE 3b. Distribution of States' Scores for Gender, in Life Insurance 
WY 
WI 
WV 
WA 
VA 
VT 
UT 
TX 
TN 
SD 
SC 
RI 
PA 
OR 
OK 
OH 
ND 
NC 
NY 
NM 
NJ 
NH 
NV 
NE 
MO 
MS 
MN 
MI 
MA 
MD 
ME 
LA 
KY 
KS 
IA 
IN 
IL 
ID 
HI 
GA 
FL 
DC 
DE 
CT 
co 
CA 
AR 
AZ 
AK 
AL • 
Permit No Mention General 
Restriction 
Weak 
limitation 
Strong 
limitation 
MT 
Outright 
Prohibition 
2014] UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE 247 
FIGURE 3c. Distribution of States'  Scores for Gender, m Disability 
Insurance 
AR 
NY 
NM 
MO 
IA 
KY 
OR 
HI 
TN 
DC 
PA 
VT 
IL 
TX 
R1 
MS MN 
ID OK 
NH NE 
ME MT 
WY NJ 
DE WV NV 
VA AL MD 
GA IN FL co 
CT WI MA AZ 
UT AK SC LA OH MT 
WA KS NC ND SD CA 
• I 
Permit No General Weak Strong Outright 
Mention Restriction Limitation Limitation Prohibition 
248 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 87: 195 
FIGURE 3d. Distribution of States' Scores for Gender, in Property/Casualty 
Insurance 
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FIGURE 3e. Distribution of States' Scores for Gender, in Health Insurance 
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Figures 3a to 3e show that many states permit the usage of gender, 
especially in life and health insurance. Indeed, with respect to life insurance 
in particular, every jurisdiction but one in the country expressly permits 
insurers to take gender into account. 1 42 Although this is inconsistent with 
our prediction of variation with respect to gender regulation across states, 
our follow up research revealed there is a good explanation for the uniform 
result: It was a reaction to the Supreme Court's 1 983 decision in Arizona 
Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation 
Plans v. Norris. 143 In Norris, the Court addressed whether it was legal for 
employers to use gender-based retirement plans.1 44 The defendant­
employer's plan gave female employees lower monthly retirement 
payments on average than male employees because women live longer than 
men according to the standard gender-based mortality tables.1 45 The Court 
ruled this to be impermissible in the employment context under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 46 Following this ruling, many states became 
concerned that the same principle might eventually be applied to privately­
provided life insurance policies. As a response, eventually every 
jurisdiction either issued a regulation or passed a statute (or both) to make 
clear that, if the Court were to expand its Norris holding in that way, life 
insurers would be permitted under state law to use gender-blended 
mortality tables. In so doing, however, the states also made clear that, as a 
matter of state law (and ignoring Title VIQ, gender-based mortality tables 
were also permitted. 147 
1 42. Montana issued a regulation in 1 983, Mont. Admin. R. 6.6.1 804, which defined "unfair 
discrimination" generally not to include gender-rated life insurance, much as other states did during this 
period. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. However, in that same year, the Montana legislature 
enacted a statute, codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-309, which beginning in 1 985, forbade insurers 
from discriminating solely on the basis of sex in insurance, including, specifically, life insurance. That 
statute continues to be controversial in Montana, where efforts to repeal or overturn the law, and to 
permit gender-based rating in various types of insurance, continue to get attention. See, e.g., Kathryn 
Haake, Panel Considers Ending Unisex Insurance Rates, LIFE HEALTH PRO (Apr. 2, 201 3), 
http://www. Ii fehealthpro.com/201 3/04/02/panel-considers-ending-unisex-insurance-rates (discussing 
proposed legislation in Montana designed to repeal the relevant provisions of § 49-2-309). 
1 43.  Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 
U.S. 1 073 ( 1983). 
1 44. Id. at 1 074. 
145.  Id. at 1 076. 
146. Id. at I 074. 
147. There were two different flurries of lawmaking on this issue. Between 1 983 and 1 989, 
twenty-seven states issued regulations that made both gender-based and gender-blended mortality tables 
permissible in life insurance. Then, beginning in the early 2000s, many states began enacting specific 
statutes and regulations on this issue that were based on the NAIC model laws and regulations, which 
permitted both gender-blended and gender-based regulation. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE 
COMMISSIONERS, NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS, A.."ID GUIDELINES §§ VI-8 14- 1 ,  Vl-8 1 5- 1  
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Outside of the life insurance contexts, Figures 3a to 3e are somewhat 
consistent with our predictions. As we predicted, it does indeed reflect a 
large degree of variation across states with respect to gender discrimination 
in auto, disability, and health insurance, with some states clustering around 
strong limitations and others around no limitations or specific permissions. 
But the results are more mixed for another of our predictions: that the 
average score for gender in auto and life insurance would be lower (less 
strict) than in health insurance because discrimination by insurers in health 
insurance tends to hurt women. Life insurance is indeed significantly less 
regulated than health insurance, but auto insurance is more regulated on 
average, as shown in Figures 3a, 3b, and 3e. 
Figures 3a to 3e show that the results are also mixed for our prediction 
that states would tend to permit insurer discrimination for gender, with a 
large number of "specifically permits." 148 
Figures 3a to 3e are even more inconsistent with our prediction of a 
low average score and lots of "no mentions,'' with respect to the use of 
gender in property/casualty insurance (excluding auto insurance). 149 As 
Figures 3a to 3e show, gender Gust like the "big three" above) is more 
heavily regulated in the property/casualty line than in any other line of 
insurance. One explanation for this phenomenon is that property/casualty 
insurers are, in fact, using gender more than we assumed. That explains 
why there are almost no "no-mention" codes in property/casualty for 
gender. But why restrict the use of gender and not permit it? One 
explanation may be that adverse selection is less of a problem with 
property/casualty insurance than with some other lines of insurance, such 
as life a11d health insurance. Alternatively, there is always the possibility 
that insurers work together to pass these bans in order to limit the 
competition among them. 
(2012). Between 2002 and 2005, forty-three statutes were passed. The only remaining jurisdictions that 
do not have a statute that specifically adopts the NAIC model statue are Arizona, California, and 
Nevada. But each of these states has either a formal regulation or some informal regulatory 
pronouncement making clear that the gender-based mortality tables were permitted to be used by life 
insurers. See ARIZ. DEP'T OF INS., REGULATORY BULL. 2006-1 0  (2006). (Arizona regulatory statement); 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2542.8 (2002) (California regulation); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 688A.327 
(2008) (Nevada regulation). 
148. Recall that this prediction was based on the adverse selection problems associated with 
individually underwritten life insurance and because such discrimination actually benefits women. 
149. Recall that this was due to the fact that we believed there was no obvious correlation between 
gender and nonauto liability and property risks. See supra Part III. Table 2 shows that our alternative 
prediction-that there may be a bi-modal distribution between states that have no statute on point and 
those that have outright prohibitions on other grounds was also not especially borne out-although 
there was a fair amount of variability. 
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Another possibility is that state legislatures pass laws such as this not 
because they are needed to curb certain behavior on the part of insurers, but 
because they create the (in these cases, false) impression that legislatures 
are doing something productive. One can see how such legislation could 
easily get passed. The insurers would not object, since the laws restrict 
them from doing something that they do not want to do anyway. Indeed, 
insurers may support such laws, whose passage may reduce the demand 
from voters for action on other fronts. The insuring public also would not 
object, because, as far as they know, these pointless laws are in fact 
constraining insurers from some socially harmful activity. Who pushes for 
such legislation? Again, the legislators themselves, who need to give the 
impression they are doing something, without offending an important 
constituency. 1 50 
3 .  Sexual Orientation 
For life/health insurance, we predicted a moderate level of average 
regulation for insurer usage of sexual orientation: less strict than for the big 
three but stricter than for age. This prediction is borne out in Figure 2 
above. The difference is statistically significant. 1 5 1 Our prediction that state 
laws on this topic would be variable also found some limited support in the 
data. As Table 2 above shows, six states have outright bans on the use of 
sexual orientation across all lines of insurance. 1 52 Sexual orientation is the 
only characteristic other than the big three and gender where states have 
enacted bans across all lines of insurance. This result is consistent with the 
fact that the Supreme Court seems now to have included sexual orientation 
among the characteristics that receive some sort of special treatment under 
Equal Protection law (even if the Court has not explicitly listed sexual 
orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification).1 53 
Nevertheless, most states have no specific regulation on sexual 
orientation at all, as indicated by Figures 4a to 4e below. With respect to 
health insurance, for example, eighteen states either prohibit or strongly 
limit the use of sexual orientation and all the other states have no specific 
1 50. Amy Monahan has done research that explores this hypothesis. In particular, she has an 
article showing that the health insurance mandates that states are most likely to pass are those that are 
already included in virtually every health insurance policy in the state. She explains this result as an 
example of the legislatures-trying-to-look-productive theory. See Monahan, supra note 6 1, at 1 99-201 . 
1 5 1 . A Wilcoxon rank sum test shows the differences are significant at less than 1 percent. 
1 52. See Table 2. Those states are California, Colorado, Delaware, Utah, Vermont, and 
Washington. 
1 53. See discussion of United States v. Windsor, 1 33 S. Ct. 2675 (201 3), supra notes 1 1 7-1 8 and 
accompanying text. 
2014] UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE 253 
regulation on sexual orientation, but have only general unfair 
discrimination laws. 1 54 The treatment is similar with the other lines of 
insurance, as shown in Figures 4a to 4e. 
What does all of this mean? There are a number of possibilities. First, 
perhaps the large majority of states believe that their general unfair 
discrimination statues will be applied to sexual orientation as well. Second, 
maybe state lawmakers believe that insurers will not use sexual orientation 
in any event, due to social norms, the threat of regulatory scrutiny, their 
inability to verify policyholders' sexual orientation, or the lack of any 
strong correlation between insured risks and sexual orientation. Finally, 
many states may not view insurance discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation as problematic: indeed, various states have affirmatively refused 
to embrace a wide array of nondiscrimination rules on the basis of sexual 
orientation.1 55 
1 54. The remaining line/characteristic specific charts are contained in the Appendix. 
1 55. To take just one example, many states do not prohibit discrimination in the workplace on the 
basis of sexual orientation. See Rebecca Baird-Remba, There Are Still 29 US States Where You Can Be 
Fired/or Being Gay, Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2013,  5:40 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/states­
where-you-can-be-fired-for-being-gay-2013-4#ixzz2iDjua V5e. 
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FIGURE 4a. Distribution of States' Scores for Sexual Orientation, in Auto 
Insurance 
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FIGURE 4b. Distribution of States' Scores for Sexual Orientation, in Life 
Insurance 
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FIGURE 4c. Distribution of States' Scores for Sexual Orientation, in 
Disability Insurance 
AR 
NY 
NM 
MO 
MT 
MS 
ID 
NH 
HI FL 
ME IA 
TN WV 
WY KY 
RI OR 
VA LA 
GA AL 
MN PA 
NE IN 
MI TX 
NJ OK UT 
NV WI MA 
ND SC DE 
CT MD VT 
SD AZ co 
AK NC DC CA 
KS OH IL WA 
• 
Permit No General Weak Strong Outright 
Mention Restriction Limitation Limitation Prohibition 
2014] UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE 257 
FIGURE 4d. Distribution of States' Scores for Sexual Orientation, in 
Property/Casualty Insurance 
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FIGURE 4e. Distribution of States' Scores for Sexual Orientation, in Health 
Insurance 
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4. Age 
Our general prediction that age would be the least regulated on 
average proved accurate, as reflected in Figure 2. The difference between 
age and credit score (the closest category) is significant in general at the 1 
percent level (although the difference is not significant for auto and 
property/casualty lines of insurance). Our specific prediction with respect 
to age and life insurance proved reasonably accurate as well: thirty-nine 
states specifically permit the use of age in life insurance; and the remaining 
states merely impose a general unfair discrimination limitation. Health 
insurance is similar, but with less uniformity: thirty-seven states permit the 
use of age in health insurance; and the rest impose specific regulations. 156 
Our predictions regarding the regulation of the use of age in the auto 
insurance markets (variability across states) was in the ballpark, though the 
amount of variation is somewhat more than we expected, as reflected in 
Figures 5a to 5e below. 
1 56. Thirteen states impose either a strong or weak limitation, and one state, New York, prohibits 
the use of age in health insurance. See Figure 5e. 
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FIGURE 5a. Distribution of States' Scores for Age, in Auto Insurance 
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FIGURE Sb. Distribution of States' Scores for Age, in Life Insurance 
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FIGURE Sc. Distribution of States' Scores for Age, in Disability Insurance 
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FIGURE 5d. Distribution of States' Scores for Age, in Property/Casualty 
Insurance 
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FIGURE Se. Distribution of States' Scores for Age, in Health Insurance 
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We predicted relatively few specific statutes would regulate 
property/casualty insurance with respect to age, only because of the 
seeming irrelevance of age. In fact, there were more than a few (twenty) 
that had some type of specific age-related restriction on property/casualty 
insurers, six of which were outright prohibitions. What this suggests, of 
course, is that we may have been wrong about the risks of property/casualty 
insurance-especially homeowners insurance-having no correlation with 
age. Indeed, when we subsequently looked into what kinds of questions 
insurers actually ask applicants for homeowners insurance (as revealed in 
their rate filings, in which they seek approval from regulators to take 
various characteristics into account in their underwriting), age was 
specifically listed. Some insurers even give senior discounts. So apparently 
age correlates more with homeowners' risk, and thus with 
property/casualty risk, than we had thought. 
5 .  Credit Score and Zip Code 
We predicted regulation of credit score and zip code would on average 
be more restrictive than for age, but less than for the big three, and that 
prediction was borne out, as indicated in Figure 2. 157 The data are also 
largely consistent with our prediction of variation across states, with some 
states limiting (though probably not prohibiting) and others either not 
mentioning or expressly permitting the use of credit score and zip code. For 
credit score in the property/casualty and auto insurance context, the 
distribution of states looks somewhat bi-modal, with states clustering either 
around some type of specific limitation, especially "strong limitation" 
(which is the modal response), and a smaller number clustering around 
"expressly permit." For zip code, there is less of a bi-modal split, but lots of 
variation. There are very few states that prohibit the use of credit score or 
zip code in property/casualty and auto insurance. For health, life, and 
disability insurance, there is a great deal of variation among the states about 
how they treat both zip code and credit score, with no discernible pattern. 
And again, there are very few states with absolute prohibitions. Somewhat 
surprisingly, for health insurance, substantial numbers of jurisdictions 
explicitly permit the use of zip codes; and the same can be said of health, 
life, and disability insurance with respect to credit scores. (See Figures 8 
and 9 in the Appendix.) 
157. As was mentioned before, the differences in general are statistically significant at the I 
percent level. 
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6. Genetics 
Here again we predicted that the average level of regulation would be 
stricter than for age, but less than for the big three, and that is consistent 
with Figure 2. For life insurance in particular, we predicted that a 
substantial majority of states would either not regulate or specifically 
permit the use of genetic testing, because of adverse selection concerns. As 
Figure 10 in the Appendix shows, there are sixteen states that have statutes 
specifically permitting the use of genetic testing by life insurers, but not as 
many as we expected-perhaps because regulators assumed that the 
absence of limitations or prohibitions would be sufficient to allow life 
insurers to use genetic testing when necessary. There were also a few (five) 
states with specific limitations, and only two states had prohibitions on the 
use of genetic testing by life insurers. The most common type of result was 
a general restriction on unfair discrimination, which we code as a 1 on the 
strictness continuum. As with sexual orientation, this result can reflect our 
coding system, which allows general restriction laws (category one) to 
capture characteristics that were not contemplated by states ' legislatures 
when they enacted these laws. With respect to health insurance, we 
predicted that, consistent with the recent federal law forbidding the use of 
genetic information, there would be similar laws at the state level, and that 
proved accurate. All but three jurisdictions prohibit the use of genetic 
testing in health insurance. 1 58 That result is even more uniform than we 
expected. For disability insurance, we predicted more variation than with 
health insurance, because of the greater moral hazard concern than there is 
with health insurance. 159 The result in fact shows variation, although there 
are more states (twenty) expressly permitting the use of genetics in 
disability insurance than we expected. Perhaps the moral hazard concern 
was larger than we imagined. 
V. CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS 
Antidiscrimination rules are a pervasive and fundamental feature of 
the American legal regime. Thousands of academic articles and judicial 
opinions have thus wrestled with the rules that govern permissible and 
1 58. New York has a statute expressly permitting the use of genetic testing in health insurance 
(which presumably is now superseded by federal Jaw). 26 N.Y. INS. LAW § 261 5  (McKinney 2006) 
(authorizing genetic testing with informed, written consent of insured). Mississippi has no statute 
directly on point (but rather only a general prohibition against unfair discrimination). MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 83-71 -7 (20 1 1  ). Maine has a statute that limits but does not prohibit the use of genetics in health 
insurance. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24-A, § 2 1 59-C (Supp. 2013). 
1 59. Moral hazard is a big problem for disability coverage, since a nontrivial number of people 
prefer, when possible, not to work and still get paid. 
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impermissible discrimination in domains ranging from employment law to 
constitutional law to housing law. And yet, in the insurance domain­
where discrimination is openly practiced and central to insurers' business 
models and economic functions-the precise rules that govern the line 
between permissible and impermissible discrimination has been almost 
entirely ignored, in large part because of the complexity and opacity of 
state law on the topic. This Article remedies this tremendous gap in the 
literature by systematically describing state insurance antidiscrimination 
law. 
Our findings reveal various discrepancies between the reality of state 
insurance antidiscrimination law and the largely theoretical literature on the 
topic. The most surprising, and potentially troubling, is that such laws often 
have little to say about the most important and divisive types of 
discrimination: distinctions based on race, national origin, or religion. This 
finding is normatively troubling on multiple fronts even if, as we suspect, 
virtually no carriers are explicitly taking into account these factors in their 
underwriting. This is because most forms of discrimination in these 
domains operate in subtle and often unconscious ways that may manifest 
themselves, for instance, in assumptions about risk in particular 
neighborhoods or for particular products. Even when actuarial support can 
be found for these assumptions, that does not mean that they are not 
intimately tied up with socially suspect characteristics. And, even in the 
absence of any impermissible motive, important and almost entirely 
unexamined questions remain about the extent to which insurers' use of 
particular characteristics that have disparate impacts on certain groups raise 
legal concerns. 
Whatever the answers are to these difficult questions, the stunted 
development of state insurance law and regulation on the topic seems to 
suggest a deeper problem. In particular, it suggests that state law and 
regulation has largely ignored difficult and fundamental questions about 
how we allow insurers to discriminate-and thus spread risk across social 
boundaries that impact discrete minority groups. Indeed, this view is 
substantially confirmed by the insurance industry's outcry over recent 
federal regulations making clear that disparate impact analysis under the 
Fair Housing Act extends to the provision of the insurance that is required 
for housing. 160 It is also confirmed by the variability in state laws on zip 
code and credit score, two characteristics that have been specifically 
alleged to operate as proxies for suspect policyholder characteristics. 
1 60. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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The states' lack of attention to these issues, combined with the recent 
federal rules on the FHA's applicability to insurance, suggests that it may 
be time for the federal government to play a larger role in regulating 
insurance discrimination impacting race, national origin, and religion. 
Indeed, federal law already pervasively regulates against discrimination on 
these bases, in both the Constitution and in numerous federal statutes. 161 To 
be sure, this fact is in tension with traditional primacy of states in 
regulating insurance markets-an approach endorsed in the McCarran­
Ferguson Act. But that allocation of powers is not absolute, and is premised 
on the assumption that states are well situated to regulate insurance markets 
effectively and, with the help of the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, consistently. Our results raise substantial questions within 
both domains. 
Nor are the normative implications of this Article's findings limited to 
the big three. For instance, this Article's findings expose a broad pattern of 
inconsistent and conflicting state laws on insurance antidiscrimination 
when it comes to gender. Across numerous lines of coverage-including 
life, automobile, and health-state law and regulation is highly variable 
and inconsistent, despite the prominence of these issues in public policy 
circles for decades. Whatever one's views are of the quality of state-level 
insurance regulation, it seems odd that the laws governing the 
circumstances in which a person may be discriminated against on the basis 
of his or her gender would be anything other than a national norm. People 
in Delaware should care about, and have a policy interest in, discrimination 
in New Mexico, and vice versa. In health insurance, at least, the Affordable 
Care Act preempted state law to articulate a principle that women should 
not be discriminated against even though they do indeed have higher 
medical costs, at least within certain age ranges. Perhaps a similar approach 
is warranted in other lines of coverage. 
In addition to these normative implications, the Article also has the 
potential to reveal which theoretical arguments on risk classification in 
insurance have traction in state policymaking. For instance, one persistent 
finding is that life insurance is less regulated than other lines of insurance. 
This finding was consistent with our predictions, because life insurance 
16 1 .  E.g. , Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006) (prohibiting 
employers from discriminating against applicants and employees on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, and national origin, including membership in a Native American tribe); Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006) (prohibiting age discrimination against 40-
and-over employees); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12 101-122 13  (2006) (prohibiting 
employers from discriminating against people with disabilities in any aspect of employment). 
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seems more susceptible to adverse selection than other lines of insurance. 
But more analysis is needed to determine whether this suggests, as we 
initially predicted, that state lawmakers and regulators are responsive to the 
risk of regulatory adverse selection due to the lobbying power and 
influence of the industry. Similarly, consistent with our predictions, age is 
less regulated than other policyholder characteristics. But whether this 
reveals more about the fairness of discrimination on the basis of mutable 
characteristics like age, or the adverse selection risk of regulatory risk­
classification restrictions on that basis, requires further interrogation and 
analysis. 
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APPENDIX 
FIGURE 6. Distribution of States' Scores for Age, by Line of Insurance 
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FIGURE 7. Distribution of States' Scores for Sexual Orientation, by Line of 
Insurance 
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FIGURE 8. Distribution of States'  Scores for Zip Code, by Line of 
Insurance 
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FIGURE 9. Distribution of States' Scores for Credit Score, by Line of 
Insurance 
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FIGURE 10. Distribution of States' Scores for Genetic Testing, by Line of 
Insurance 
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